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There are some militarists who say:
"We are not interested in politics but only in
the profession of arms."
It is vital these
s impl e-mi nded mi 1 i tar i s t s be made to realize
the
relationship
that
exists
between
politics and military affairs. Military
action is amethod used to attain a political
goa 1.
While military affairs and political
affairs are not identical, it is impossible
to isolate one from the other.
Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, 1937

The mode of being the new intellectual can no
longer consist in eloquence,
but in
active participation in practical life, as
constructor,
organizer,
and
"permanent
persuader
.

.

(Gramsci
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INTRODUCTION

This paper will consist of three major parts:

history

,

an introduction to the

concepts and practice of polwar from its inception in the
Russian Red

Army to its introduction to non-Corrmunist military forces; a
rather detailed

description of the Repub 1
system;

ic of

Vietnam Armed Forces General Political Warfare

and finally, conclusions drawn

from those two parts as

to

the

appl icabi lity of a type of polwar system for the armed forces of a contempor-

ary third world member (Egypt) of the "free" nations of the world.
In

pol

i t

my introduction

I

will discuss briefly the genealogy of the term

ical war fare or "polwar" as it has come to be used by the US government in

an esoteric sense, that is, in the politicization of military forces as an

attempt to achieve certain fundamental goals (such as loyalty) within those
forces
The basic concept of polwar originated with the Russian corrmissar

system,

giving the political cadre absolute control over

revolutionary armed

forces,

thus

making

the

them a decisive

preservation of the Corrmunist Party's power.

In

1924,

the

tool

corrmunist
for

the

concept was

introduced in China by Russian advisors, and later was revised and has been
used to the present

t

ime by bo th the Corrmuni

s t

Chinese and the Nat iona lists in

forms modi fied to conform to their respect ive ideologies

.

(

See Appendix D.

The polwar system introduced to the Republic of Vietnam in 1960 was

adapted from the Nationalist Chinese system.

Although the pr imary mi ss ion

of the Vietnamese system was ensuring the loyalty of their own armed forces,
two additional tasks were included in the charter:

1

gaining and maintaining

2

the support of the civilian populace in both friendly
and eneny controlled

areas and destroying the loyalty of the enemy.
the

These latter missions were

responsibility of the psychological warfare element of

Political Warfare Department.

The

Viet

the General

Cong and North Vietnamese Army

polwar organizations were tailored after the Corrmunist Chinese system.
The South Vietnamese polwar system failed with its armed forces,
but
this

failure does not

system,

invalidate

the

concept.

The Nationalist Chinese

the only formalized system outside the corrmunist
orbit (with the

possible exception of Israel about whose internal military affairs little
known), still

is

question remains
benef i

in place and keeping

therefore:

Would such

today for other countries of the

t

its military house

large standing military forces?

" f

a

in order.

is

The

system have application and

ree wor Id

,

"

especial ly those with

This thesis is based on that inquiry.

We mus t begin by providing a clear definition of this somewhat confusing
term, political warfare, or polwar, the abbreviated form which the acronymical ly-minded Americans who have had to deal wi th the phenomenon have given us.

Here

I

should digress briefly to point out that of the Americans who have dealt

with the sub jec t mos t have done so apa thet ical ly many with distaste,
,

with outright revulsion.
armed forces, polwar
a

is a sort of

"alien corn," something, after all, that was

adopted by Asians, and first by Asian corrmuni sts

forces

(

number

To most Americans, and especially those in the

Russian invention, and a corrmunist one at that.

digestible.

a

,

The fact that it was

doesn't make

it

any more

All this is reinforced by the fact that the members of the armed

and general popu 1 ace as we 1

1 )

of any count ry such as the United States

which presupposes the loyalty, stability and affirmative response of its

*

.

3

armed

forces considers

resort

such devices

to

as

internal

propaganda,

political supervision of leaders and outright spying on
individual soldiers

reprehensible
The distinction between political warfare (traditionally)
and the sense

used in this paper is one of focus.

While we usually think of political

warfare as international conflict involving the broad spectrum
of assets
available to most nat ions--diplomat ic

economic, military, and so on--to

,

pursue their objectives, polwar in its military sense may be defined as:
An organizational attempt to solve deeprooted non-combat military problems centered on
questions of loyalty or allegiance and civilmilitary relations, as well as the traditional
problems of corruption, despotism, nepotism,
mutiny, desertion, morale and soldier-dependent
social welfare needs
.

As

I

have pointed out,

the difference mainly

is

one of focus; while the

"military" is merely one asset in the conduct of political warfare in the

broader

,

more usual sense, the military (the forces of a given country),

in

the esoteric sense, is the asset of interest, and pr imar ily only with respect
to its structure and interna

1

operat ions

ology originated with the General

.

The unfortunate choice of termin-

Political

Warfare Department

of

the

Nationalist Chinese defense ministry,* and when the Chinese system was
When, in the early

introduced in South Vietnam the same name was adopted.
1960s,

the Americans began "advising"

their penchant for the "bumper

st

i

the Vietnamese military they, with

cker " -"buzz word" language so prevalent

today, coined the word, always capitalized, Polwar.

I

have included this

last fact only because on subsequent pages of this paper the term may be seen

capitalized on reproductions of US government documents.

*

Chiang Kai-shek is credited with inventing the term, Political warfare, as
it is used in this thesis.

4

I

have selected Egypt as a possible candidate for polwar
because the

problems within Egypt's Central Security Forces which led
to the uprising of
February, 1986 cons i s ted main ly of those

I

have described above.

They do not

comprise all the problems that exist within that organization; nor
have

I

discussed, or even alluded to, the internal problems of the rest of Egypt's

armed forces.

I

will deal with this subject in Chapter III of this paper

which will examine also the possibility, des i reabi
introducing

a

ty and feasibility of

polwar system into the Egyptian armed forces

suit Egypt's national
In

1 i

Chapter

II

,

one "tai lored" to

interest as well as that of the US and the West.

of this paper the Republic of Vietnam's psychological

warfare element, a part of its polwar organization, will be discussed, along
with propaganda, one of the primary instruments of "psywar."

Psychological

operations, a term used by US practitioners, also will be mentioned.

All

these terms warrant clarification.*

The terms psychological warfare and psychological operations, though

frequently used interchangeably--and what

is

worse,

held by some to be

synonymous with propaganda--can be more clearly and specifically defined.
Psychological warfare or psywar, in the official US government sense, may be

defined as the planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions
(such as terrorism) having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions,
emot ions

suppor

t

,

at

t i

tudes and behavior of foreign hostile groups in such a way as to

the achievement of nat ional objectives.

While psychological opera-

tions (again, in the US view) or psyop, may include psywar, they are broader

The basis and sources for this explanation of these terms may be found in my
essay "Propaganda: The Rhetoric of Power," UMASS, Amherst, 16 December
*

1986.

5

in

scope

in

that

they

encompass

also

those

political,

economic

and

ideological actions planned and conducted to create in neutral
or friendly

groups the emotions, attitudes and behavior to support the same
objectives.

United States advisors introduced psywar to the South Vietnamese not
long
after the French de feat in

I

ndoch i na

;

it

was all the Amer i cans (or the Wes tern

powers for that matter) had to offer in the way of "mind warfare."
Minh, victorious in their

1

ong an t i-colonial war

,

The Viet

owed much o f the i

r

success

to the successful use of their polwar system, which they had had the wi sdom to

adopt as ear ly as 1938 from the Communist Chinese.
that the US system was inadequate to their needs

still

in

the process

of

developing their

;

The South Vietnamese saw

the Nationalist Chinese were

"free world"

system,

Vietnamese, understandably, realized that they could hardly adopt
ist system, much less go to the enemy for advice and assistance.

but

the

a

commun-

In

Taiwan,

Chiang Kai-shek, in more peaceful circumstances, could claim his right to
polwar as a "latent legacy."

After all, was he not the first commandant of

the first polwar academy (inspired by the Russian communists in 1924)

in

Quite reasonably, the Vietnamese turned to him when, by the early

China?

1960s, he had perfected his system.

At that time the US-inspired psywar of

the 1950s became subordinated to the overall polwar organization.

Vietnamese never adopted the more definitive term, psyop.

The South

The South Viet-

namese effort targeted all groups and made no distinction between "psywar"
and "psyop."

Interestingly, although the US government's official position

psyop

i

s

is that

not usedwithin the US, and although the use of propaganda directed at

US citizens anywhere has been outlawed by Congress (PL 102), the course of

.

6

events seems to disprove this; the Iran-contra affair,
which still rages at
this writing,

While

it

is

a

classic example among, undoubtedly, many.

would appear that there are almost as many definitions of

propaganda as there are people who have written about
those

who

even

claim that

everything

is

Driencourt) and some who, because definition

i t

,

and while there are

propaganda
is so

(such

as

Jacques

difficult, have abandoned

the term altogether, the definition adopted by the US Institute for Military

Ass i stance --which has overall responsibility for psywar (US definition) at
the nat ional level and partial responsibi lity (military aspects
is

adequate

for

the

purpose

of

this

paper:

"any

)

for psyop--

information,

ideas,

doctrines or special appeals in support of national objectives, designed to
influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes and behavior of any specified

group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly."
phrase "and behavior" obviously

is of

The

great importance since, even with an

attitudinal change, some sort of action

is

necessary to achieve the desired

objectives
A word on sources is necessary.
II

of this paper

,

The reader wi

1 1

not ice that in Chapter

the part which describes in some detail the polwar system of

the Republic of Vietnam, few citations are made and a number of charts or

organizational diagrams are provided to simplify understanding the rather
technical descriptions of the text.

The written text is based, with the

exception of some speculative or philosophical passages taken from memories
of my experiences in Vietnam or from journals or diaries

I

kept there, almost

exclusively from official handbooks, reports, narrative lesson manuscripts

which

I

produced while at the JFK Center for Military Assistance at Ft.

7

Bragg, North Carolina, and briefings, many of
which

attended, given by

I

representatives of the Republic of Vietnam, the
Republic of China and the

United States.

To have

attempted

to

cite

each

source

(in

some

cases

literally scraps of yellowed paper) would have
produced a plethora of notes
(and corresponding numbers)

work.

i

ncomnensurate with the size and format of this

Reproductions of the organizational diagrams of the RVNAF
units and

agencies

were

taken

from

the

Political Warfare Handbook for Advisors

,

published by the US Army Institute for Military Assistance at Ft. Bragg, in
1970; those relating to ROC polwar were taken from a briefing report (dated 15

Augus t 1964) entitled

Info rma tion Briefing on the Genera 1 Political War fare

Department, Ministry of Defense, Republic of China."

Appendices as well.)

The

textual

information on

(This applies to the

organization and

the

functions of both the RVN and ROC systems was obtained in large part from those
two sources.

None of the information used

is

classified or, if

it

was at one

time, has been declassified.

Recently,

taking

more

is

f

a

scholar with humourous inclinations said to me, "today,

rom one source is cons idered plagiarism, while taking from

called research.

"

This remark

,

though humourous

kernal of truth, depending upon the "one source."

,

a

dozen or

may have at least

a

A scholarly book by Carmen

Haider-- Do We Want Fasci sm ? --pub 1 i shed in 1934, which describes the Italian

Fascismof the period, contained four footnotes among 274 pages.*
had

spent

a

year

in

Italy

accumulating her

information;

therefore, were of the best (if she is to be believed).
fine a point on the matter,

I

her

sources,

Without putting too

think the final word as to my inquiry about the

practicability of po lwar in the "free wor Id" today mus t be

*

The author

:

1

am the pr ima ry

Carmen Haider, Do We Want Fascism?, New York, John Day, 1934.

8

source for this work.

All

I

can add to this is that although

it

has been said

also that today academicians and other scholars
write only for their peers
am indifferent to the possible val idi ty of this
statement),

(I

hope that what

I

I

have written will be understandable and perhaps of use
to the "acting laiety."
Finally,

a

cautionary note.

intensively on polwar as
those

countries

which,

a

Because

this

thesis

concentrates

so

possible means of strengthening and stabilizing

while

developing

economically,

socially

and

politically, maintain large military forces (for various reasons),
and are

striving genuinely to improve the condition of their people, there may be
tendency on the part of the reader to feel that polwar
instant cure for all the ills of the "third world."

factors mus t obt a i n

if

is

a

suggested as an

Obviously, a number of

such a system is to play a successful support ing role - -

the justice and fairness of US foreign policy toward the country of interest,

legitimate constitution of that country's government, and proper planning,

organization and supervision of assistance and advisory efforts on the part
of the US or its allies are a few.

Yggsdras ill

,

Po lwar

,

in itself, mus

t

not be seen as an

the imassive tree of Norse legend whose great roots and branches

hold together the universe.

CHAPTER

I

--GENES IS

The Red Army and Birth of Pol war

Following the successful initial stage of the Bolshevik
revolution

in

the Autumn of 1917, the new revolutionary government in Russia, recognizing
that absolute loyalty was essential among its soldiers, laid the
foundation
for a new army.

The problem confronting the new leaders was in adapting

efficiently the positive aspects of the old imperialist army to what they
referred to as the "armed section" of the proletariat.

Above all, the new

army had to be a political one, "the expression of the proletariat and the

creature of the party.

its creation was announced by decree signed on 28

"2

January 1918,3 just prior to demobilization of what was left of the Russian
Imper i al Army (lOFebruary).

The nucleus of the new organ ization, official-

ly named "The Red Army of Workers and Peasants," was made up of "worthwhile"

sections of the "army of the revolution," that is, "the Red Guards and the

politically 'conscious'

soldiers" of the old Czarist army. 4

As Michael

Garder writes:
Initially it was an egalitarian militia
recruited on a voluntary basis and with elected
leaders (one could not yet speak of officers).
This militia reflected the ideas of Lenin and the
majority of the leadership about the form of the
Experience, and
armed forces of the proletariat.
was exploi t exper
ience
this
the realism with which
ideas.
these
to
change
ed was soon
,

We should keep in mind the last sentence of this quotation.
One thing was certain

:

the new revolutionary government needed an army

urgently; amid the confusion of pos t -revolut ionary events and during the

"consolidation" phase of the political reorganization of the huge Russian

9

^

,

10

land mass,

the success or failure of total transition to
conmuni sm would

depend upon the creation of an efficient, high
y mot ivated
1

,

and absolutely

loyal armed force.

The treaty of Brest-Li tovsk

German Diktat

,

,

signed on

3

March 1918, which amounted to a

speeded up the collapse of the old Czarist empire.

Uk rainians procla imed their

i

ndependence and cone 1 uded

a s epa rate peace

The

with

Germany; the Poles, who had experienced unity during the German occupation,

stood firm in the hope of achieving national sovereignty, while the Finns and
the Baltic provinces broke from Russia.

Caucasus
the

Separate republics emerged in the

the people of the Don River basin equivocated

,

Czechoslovakian Army Corps

confusion.

opposed

the

,

Reds,

and in Siberia, where
there was

Russia was not to "turn red" overnight.

6

even more

Garder notes:

Almost everywhere centres of counter-revolution sprang up:
secret associations of all political
tendencies (monarchists, liberals, social
revolutionaries).
The Allies, faced wi th the fai t
accompli of the 'betrayal of Brest-Li tovsk
were
open 1 y host i 1 e towards the new regime
Anarchy and
lawless power everywhere ruled supreme.
The trial
of strength which the new government had to face was
very different from that of November 7, 1917.
,

'

.

He cont inues

,

"the implacable will and the cold logic of Lenin

the unbounding energy and supple intel
to

1

,

together with

igence of the realistic Trotsky, were

make the Red Army-- the ir creation--tri umphant

in the end

"
.

8

How did they

in the face of obstacles which seemed insurmountable, achieve this triumph?

On

4

March a military-political organization was created with the

purpose of organizing the Red Army; on

13

March, Leon Trotsky,

then the

People's Conmissar for War, and a longtime advocate of conscription, strict

discipline and professional officershipas essentials for
appointed chairman of this Supreme War Council.

a regular

army was

Trotsky argued that

,

as

11

industry needs engineers, as farming needs qualified agronomists,
so military specialists are indispensable to defence. "9
of the amateurism of

the month-old revolutionary "militia" which

dynamic in its nucleus was little disciplined
idea of a proletarian army,

an army which

disciplined through revolutionary zeal
officers,

gove r nment

in

the new army.

though

rejected the

theory was to be

led

and

Trotsky argued that the old Czarist
short-lived

provisional

ible for the catast rophe that had befallen the a rmy and the

count ry, should be u t

t

.

in its ranks; he

many of whom held Kerensky and his
r espons

Trotsky was contemptuous

i 1 i

zed to provide the necessary techn ical experience for

Though his opponents argued that these officers could not be

rusted Trotsky pres eve red and

" r

ecr ui tment " (ins uch forms as volunteering,

compuls ion and threats--in many cases fami lies were held hostage) began.

In

1918 alone the former czarist officers "provided more than three-quarters of
the conmanding and administrative staffs of the Red Army. "10

The elective

system, which was a genuinely free system and wherein anyone from the ranks

could become a leader of troops, was
es tabl

i

a

thing of the past.

Trotsky had

shed the first of the three elements whi ch were to make the new Red Army

success ful --prof ess ional i sm.

His

action came none

too

soon,

as

former

officers of the old regime's army were joining the counterrevolutionaries

everywhere in Russ i a

.

To counter this threat newl y formed Red Army uni t s--

1 1

brigades, divisions, armies--under the new leadership of experts began to
appear everywhere.
On

4

April 1918 a corps of political conmissars was created, and a few

days later military regions were set up with wards and districts subordinate
to them.

Purposeful 1 y

,

these regions did not coincidewith the boundaries of

the soviet republics wh i ch had been the dec 1 a red aim of the Bolshevik

1

eader s

,

.

12

thereby giving
country. 12

the

party more centralized

political

control

over

the

Each of the regional offices (and their
subheadquarters) was

headed by three "functionaries":

a professional officer from the old
army,

and two political conmissars for military affairs
whose loyalty to the party
was considered unquest ionabl e

.

professional officership made

1

3

a

Although Trotsky acknowledged that the
fundamental contribution to winning the

civil war against the counterrevolutionaries, he was,
at the same time,

determined that this should be

a

"class" army.

As

Ian Grey tells us:

(Trotsky) depended on the hard core of dedicated members of the communist party, and up to half
of the total party membership served in the army.
He insisted that the new army must never challenge
or undermine the revolution. 14

Understandably, relations between themilitary leaders and the commissars often were

s

trained

,

espec ially in the earlier stages of this new system;

one need have little knowledge of or experience in the military to appreciate
the a 1

how we

1 i t

1

1

ude of professi ona

1

-meaning they may be.

soldiers being super vi sed by amateurs
But Trotsky realized this also.

,

no mat ter

According to

Fedotoff White, Trotsky dictated that:
in purely military matters, in all operations work
and combat problems the last work was left
to
the military specialists.
The political commissars were instructed not to interfere with operation orders of the military specialists.
Their
signatures on military documents merely signified
that the given order was not a counter-revolut ion1 S
ary device.
,

,

.

.

.

And eventually relationships began to improve, mutual respect evolved and
with

it

greater understanding and the coordination necessary to achieve the

overall objective:

ment

.

the preservation of the tenuous, newly-formed govern-

But Garde r probab 1 y tells it best, and deserves to be quoted at length

,

13

The corrmissar was there certainly to supervise
the 'chief' but he was there equally to support
and
aid him.
It was he who, in the name of the party,
,

enforced discipline, approved and had executed the
orders of an 'aristocrat' and imposed him on the
proletariat. Thanks to the corrmissar, an iron
discipline
was
re-established. The
former
officers who had suffered so much during the period
of anarchy in 1917 began to experience respect for
their newmasters.
As psycho-political officer of
the unit, the corrmissar played a considerable role
on themoral plane.
Themasses who had so abruptly
lost the motive for action when the old motto God
Tsar, Fatherland' disappeared, found, in the exhortations of the corrmissar, a new revolutionary
faith. 16
,

'

Thus

Trotsky

established

his

second

formula

for

success:

the

use

of

political corrmissars to ensure loyalty to the new government (in actuality,
and as the system has worked to the present day, to the party).
point onward the Soviet Army has had a form of dual

From this

leadership.

At

times

(usually during war, civil or otherwise) the military expert has more power
than at others; sometimes, the political "amateur" becomes so proficient in

military mat ter s that he may
to his political ones.

where

,

for example

,

di scharge

strictlymilitary duties
system

In such a case, the

the political officer of

,

is

in addi

t

ion

termed a unified one

let us say

,

a bat tal ion

in actuality as the unit's executive officer, or second in corrmand.

,

serves

Other-

wise the system can be called dual or parallel wherein a separate political

system exists alongside the military "chain of corrmand."

Whatever the case,

some form of political supervision exists to ensure that loyalty or relia-

bility, which is essential to keeping the ruling group in place.

Russian revolutionaries this security was so important that

major units

(

With the

in some of the

army, army group or fronts) members of the Bolshevik leadership

itself served as corrmissars.

s

14

But

the system of "psycho-political" corrmissars was
considered,

itself, not adequate to the task of providing this vital

security.

in

The

leaders saw from the outset that a final "fail safe" system or organization

was needed, one that would ensure even the loyalty of the corrmissars.

Enter

Felix Dzerzhinsky and the "all-Russian extraordinary commission to fight

counter-revolution and sabotage," or Cheka

,

the third and final element of

the newly-formed Red Army.

The Cheka had been created, again by decree of the newly established

Bolshevik government, on

7

December 1917, with Dzerzhinsky, an idealistic

Pole and tried and true revolutionary, at its head.

Initially the Cheka was

concerned only with the civilian sector, but with the army's increasing
opera t ions in the civil war

(

coupl edwith the fact that there was no counter-

espionage organization worthy of the name in the Red Army) the Cheka, whose
civilian res pons ibi lities often overlapped the army'

s

penetrated the military structure at every level.

Today's KGU (internal)

area of interest, soon

and KGB (external) "security" organizations grew out of the Cheka.
And so, as Garder

sums

it

(military specialist) and the cheki st

Army make their appearance:

"with

up,

,

the

commissar,

1”

the voenspet

three fundamental factors of the Red
tt

enthusiasm, expert knowledge and terror."

In order to acquire a clearer

1

8

understanding of all polwar organizations

some discussion of basic structural concepts is needed.

alternatives for polwar organization are

a

The fundamental

unified (or intergrated) system

and a parallel or dual system. In the unified system the political officers

serve in two capacities:

as political officers and as regular executive

officers or deputies, with the traditional duties of those latter assignments
under the unit commander.

They serve, in other words, a dual role, which

is

15

not to be confused with the dual system

This latter organizational and

.

functional concept is one wherein the entire structure
of political officers
and cadre as a separate hierarchy is superimposed on the
military one, each
unit at all levels down to company having a political officer
pe£ se attached
but distinct from the purely military hierarchy and responsible
only for

polwar requirements, tasks and supervision.
is

In this case the

polwar of ficer

responsible to the unit corrmander for providing the necessary polwar

support

and responsible also

to

the

next

echelon's

polwar officer

for

accomplishing his part of the overall polwar mission.
In the

unified system the polwar officer

is

answerable to his corrmanding

officer for accomplishing the duties of second- i n-corrmand (corrmon to all

executive officers or deput ies in allmilitary forces) and providing him with
polwar support.

Nonetheless he

is

responsible to the GPWD (at national

level), through his counterparts, up through the military hierarchy, for

accompl ishing the polwar mission, i.e., strictly for polwarmatters.

As did

the South V ietnamese later on, the ROC armed forces adopted a system combining

both concepts

:

down to regimental level the dual system was used (aside from

reasons of prestige, at that level and higher the polwar officer's
t

ime job )

;

be 1 ow tha t

,

the uni

f

ied system.

Use of the uni

f

i

ed sys tern, having

the polwar officer integrated into the unit, is the prefer red mode

no disagreement on this.

is a full

;

there is

One may recall the contempt in which Nazi Gestapo

officers were held by most German officers who had to tolerate their ferretlike security tactics.

The unified system engenders more mutual

trust,

simplifies mission accomplishment by simplifying coordination, and saves

manpower.

A more subtle but extremely important benefit lies in the fact

that it makes the polwar officer more of a team member

1
;

9

this is good for both

16

hismorale and that of the troops, and itmakes him seemingly

,

if not actually,

more accessible to the members of the command as well
as more quickly aware of
problems which may grow worse without his immediate attention.

Finally, it

enables him to be in a position where he may be more
intimately aware of the
actions, opinions, perhaps even the thoughts of the unit
commander.

Although less desirable, there are times when the dual system
must or
should be used, such as when the political officers are unqualified through
lack of military experience or

training, or both,

to

serve in a purely

military role, or when their polwar duties are so demanding that they have
time for little else (as in the case of officers at regimental or higher

level).

Add i

t

i

ona 1 1 y

,

if the

military

1

eader s do not have the full trust of

the government in power it would be inadvisable to place the polwar officers

(possibly at any level) in such close subordination to them.
latter case the Russians are a good example.

As to this

Initially, Trotsky used the

dual system; later, after the civil war-- during which the political commis-

sars acqui red some military knowledge

began trusting and working well
Soviets adopted a unified system.
has been seen to shift.

,

i

f

not expert i se

with

,

and when many of them

their military

counterpar ts--the

Depending upon the times the Soviet system

In the later 1930s

during the Stalin purges when some

eighty percent of the officer corps was under suspicion, the dual system
reappeared; during the second World War when, in desperation, all Russians

desirous of preserving their homeland had to cooperate and there was little
time for discussing political

system (which

is

subtleties,

in place today).

they went back to the unified

17

Finally,

dictates

the

must be understood

it

extent

and

that

complexity of

the

the

scope of polwar activity

organization.

The Russians

invented polwar as a system of ensuring that their new
revolutionary army

would be loyal and responsive to the politics which brought
at least until they had consolidated their position.

it

into existence,

There was no time (and

there were precious few assets) to spare on programs for the
welfare of the

soldiers or their families or on
sense).

c ivi

1

-mi

1 i

tary relations (in a positive

The main thrust of the Soviet system was to ensure the loyalty and

effectiveness of the new Red Army, especially its leaders, and this was
accomp

1 i

shed ma inly through har sh and nega t i ve measures

— spy

i

ng

,

r epor

ting,

routing out and "neutralizing" dissidents, harsh, didactic, persistent and

unequivocal political indoc t r inat ion

system of

t

,

and perhaps most effective, a ruthless

ak i ng hostages and reprisals.

rule of necess i ty

.

These measures were dictated by the

The sys tern wh ich the Russ i an s introduced to China just a

few years after their civil strife ended was extremely refined compared with
the one they had inaugurated.

And gradually the Soviet system evolved into

one which was much more comprehensive and sophisticated,

employing

the

totality of assets which became available to the political department of
their armed forces.

90

The Chinese Connection

While these cataclysmic events were taking place to the north, the
Chinese, foil owing their rebe

1 1

ion agains t the Manchu Dynasty in 1911, were

having problems with "war lordi sm.

"

This semi -anarchical state of affairs,

wh ich we in the Wes t general ly regarded as traditional, had its roots in the

Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864) when regional "armies" were recruited to put

n

18

down the uprising.

The Manchus never really regained control over
these

armies and, when the last emperor abdicated in
1912, control of the new

"republican" government was taken over by YUan Shih-k'ai,
former Manchu

premier who had the loyalty of the most powerful warlord army.
of this warlordism followed YUan's death in 1916 and lasted
unt

The "heyday"
i 1

Chiang Kai-

shek established some semblance of order in 1928. 21

Meanwhile,

Dr.

Sun Yat-sen, who had been

trying unsuccessfully to

establish a truly republican form of government with many constitutional
re forms

,

was forced to flee into exile in Japan

.

Foil owi ng Yllan Shih-k' ai

death Sun moved back to China and settled in Canton where
Southern China

a

'

s

government of

had been set up in opposition to the nominal Peking regime of

YUan and other northern warlords.

Sun's efforts to gain support from this

"government" failed because his views were thought to be too democratic.

From 1918 to 1923 Dr. Sun shuttled four times between Canton and Shanghai;

eventually he was forced to flee Canton for Shanghai where, in January 1923,
he met Adolph Joffe, the Soviet envoy.

This meeting was to change Chinese

OO

(and world) history.

Earlier, during its moment of greatest crisis Soviet Russia had made its
first friendly overture toward China:

Karakhan, Deputy Foreign Corrmissar

) .

the Karakhan Declaration (after Leo

The Declaration, which, though initi-

ated in July 1919 did not reach Peking until March 1920 due to the turmoi
Siberia, was received enthusiastically by the Chinese.

expression of good will was followed by

a

Alexander Paikes,

credentials in Peking.

leading another

i

This first concrete

second Soviet mission led by

Ignatius Your in, a member of the Central Siberian Soviet.
1921,

1

Soviet

23

mission,

On 16 December

presented his

Paikes's mission, not enthusiastically received,

was followed by that of Joffe.

24

19

Lenin was attracted by events in China.

But more than that his hopes for

the spread of Corrmunism throughout the masses
of western Europe had been

frustrated,

in large part by the establishment of the Weimar
Republic in

Germany; and the western allies were actively
engaged in the counterrevolu-

tionary effort.

At the same time Dr. Sun, who had been attempting, unsuc-

cessful ly, to get help from those same western powers, began to
negotiate for
the employment of German ex-officers.

It

was then that the Soviets quickly

stepped in.

Although the Peking regime still was the official one

in the

view of

foreign powers, Joffe was not impressed and felt that Chinese unification

could best be achieved through Russian support of Sun Yat-sen.

Though Sun,

like the Peking regime, had not been sympathetic to the Russian corrmunists,

certain factors impelled him toward

a Soviet

alliance:

he was frustrated

with the Chinese revolution, disillusioned with the West, impressed by the
success of the Russ i an revolution, and impressed also by recent Soviet policy

toward China.

On their part the Russ ians

,

apart from want ing to sow the seeds

of Corrmunism in China (peasants had now been included as "workers of the

world"), were concerned with the rise of Japan in the East and wished to

consolidate an alliance with China for geopolitical reasons.
The Kun Chang tang (KCT, Chinese Conmuni ty Party) came into existence in

Shanghai in 192125 and shortly afterward established an uneasy alliance or

"united front" with Dr. Sun's Koumintang (KMT, Chinese Nationalist Party)
against

the

Peking Government.

Undoubtedly, Sun's acceptance of Soviet

cooperation had much to do with his agreement to form such an alliance.
In

to

August 1923, Chiang Kai-shek, Sun's secretary and protege, was sent

Moscow to intervi ew Lenin, Trotsky and

St a

1

in and to study the organization

^

20

of

Russian Communism,

Grusenberg,

especially

the

Red Army.

In

September,

Mikhail

later known as Michael Borodin, arrived at Canton with
forty

Russian advisors to he lp establ i sh the Whampoa (or Whangpo) Military Academy.
As Henry Wei describes

it:

Dr. Sun had entertained the notion of establishing
an academy for training officers for a revolutionary army.
Now that Soviet cooperation was available, the project received prompt attention.
The
result was
the Whangpo Military Academy for

Officers. When Chiang Kai-shek returned from
Moscow in the spring of 1924, he was appointed
principal of the academy.
Forty Russian experts
were employed as instructors and advisers.
frnphasis was laid not merely on military training but
also on political indoctrination.
The object was
to create an army not only skilled in warfare but
fully conscious of the social and political significance of the coming revo lut ion
.

Whampoa Military Academy was opened on
inauguration on

16

June by Dr. Sun. 27

1

May 1924, with an official

Chiang Kai-shek, later to lead the

Chinese Nationalists, was the first conmander or "principal" of the School.
Chou En-lai, who was to become Mao's premier after the victorious communist
revolution, ran the political department of the Academy.

Thus the seed of

polwar (Chiang and Chou are only two examples among many in both hierarchies)

were implanted early in both future Nationalist and Corrmun i s t leaders.

Mao

Tse-tung at this time effectually ran the Propaganda Department of the

Kuomintang

Central

Executive

Academy to head the KMT upon Dr

.

Corrmi

tee 28
.

Chiang,

Sun's death in 1925

all politically indoctrinated,
In 1927,

t

,

leaving

before

passed some

3

the

,000 cadets

,

through the school.

beginning with the "Shanghai Massacre" in April (see below),

the KMT launched a campaign of suppression of the CCP which culminated in the

rupture of the first United Front.

The CCP movement shifted from the urban

t

1

21

areas to the countryside and went "underground."

This period marked the

beginning of the Chinese Red Army which, "was henceforth
to be the bulwark of
the CCP in its struggle for survival and power
(and)

members acqui red mi
ly

1 i

tary exper ience

,

(v)irtually all CCP

whi le the Red Army itself was thorough-

penetrated by party organization and controls "29
.

We must see what forms

this penetration took.

The regular communist forces had political personnel at all
levels of

organization providing, in addition to political education and indoctrination, for the administration of soldiers' clubs and the issuance of training

manuals and newspapers.

Rather than playing "watchdog" over non-carmuni s

officers (as in Russia) the political officers had an educative mission.
Their

i

nspi rat i on was Russian since Borodin and his advisors had provided the

initial guidance and impetus at Whampoa.

But

it

was the activities and

purposes of the Chinese "polwar" officers which differed from those of the
Soviet commissars.

Chalmers Johnson notes that "these political workers

were not exact ly analogous to the familiar political commissars of the Soviet
Army; the Chinese Communist political officers had both a different origin

and a different function. "30

Johnson cites

F.

F.

Liu on the subject:

These (Chinese) commissars took up the task of
organizing the soldiers into party cel Is, educating
them politically, teaching them to read and write,
and acting as guardians and spokesmen for the
Thei r dut ies were
underprivi leged soldiers.
all part of their dual purpose of reforming the army
through bettering its morale and of strengthening
party loyalty. At the same time they won the
reputation of keeping the soldiers' welfare at
heart 3
.

.

.

.

Apart

f

rom the troop instruction of the political of f icers--and the work

of the propaganda units, under whose officers programs were directed at the

.
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enemy (the Japanese or KMT, or both) and at local Chinese
res idents— of prime
importance was the program of troop we 1 fare

,

a cornerstone of all subsequent

polwar systems patterned after the Chinese Corrmunist model.
At the "grass
roots" level (company level) was the Soldiers' Club with a
range of activities

geared to

improve

the welfare

of

the

common soldier.

Within the Club

Management Corrmittee were subcommittees such as:
(a)

Hygiene Subcommittee
company area.

(t>)

Economic Subcommittee
for supervising the preparation of food
and the company's budgeting.

(c)

Wall Newspaper Subcommittee
newspapers

(d)

Culture and Recreation Subcommittee
for organizing reading
instruction, evening assemblies, self-criticism ("study") meet-

f or

:

car ryi ng out sani tat ion dut ies in the

:

:

for compiling and posting wail

:

ings, etc.
(e)

Johnson,

Physical Training Subcommittee

who provides

this

information,

leading off-duty sports.

for

:

claims

that

although

the

Club

Management Committee was "guided" by the company political officer, the
committee itself was elected by popular vote. 32

Whatever the case, we see

here the beginning of the organizational attempt to improve the lot of the
rank and file, a sys t emat i zed attempt which was to grow in sophi s t icat i on and

efficiency in later polwar organizations.
While some systemof political control existed in the PLA from the time
that Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh joined to form the Fourth Red Army in Apr

i 1

1928,

the cornerstone of its polwar organization was the Kutien Resolution, the

pub 1 i shed version of a speech given by Mao at Kut i en in December 1929.33

John

Gittings calls this "the locus classicus in the Maoist scriptures on this

question of party control over the army. "34

The Resolution has been

23

republished in part or in its entirety on a number of
occasions when the CCP
felt impelled to revitalize its central themes of
"improving army solidarity

and discipline, establishing good relations with the
civilian population,

and winning over the enemy. "35

Gittings writes:

The Kutien conference was held at a time when
condi t ions in the Red Army were still disorganized.
Its ranks included ex-warlord soldiers, peasant
militiaman, raw recruits, bandits, and fugitives
from justice.
It was beset by lack of discipline,
remnants of militarism’, with some officers maltreating or even beating their men, and 'vagabondage' defined as a di s inc 1 inat ion to set t le down to
the serious tasks of government --probab ly a
euphemism for banditry. This desperate need to
hold the army together and prevent its deterioration into yet another bandit force gave flesh and
blood to the abstract principles of political
cont rol 36
'

'

,

'

.

Consequently, Mao's speech dealt with "'erroneous conceptions' in the army,
party organization, party education, army propaganda, soldiers' political
training,

special

education of

young

prisoners, and relations between mi
the

army, "37

thus

providing

emphasized the need for

a

a

1 i

soldiers,

favorable

treatment

of

tary and political authorities within

fundamental model

for modern polwar.

He

political structure extending to the lowest level

(squad "cells") and providing political education for soldiers and polwar

cadres alike.

As Gittings rightly says:

The Kutien Resolution is important not only
because it is the first extended treatment of the
question of political control and education by Mao
or any other Chinese corrmunist leader, but because
it sets the pattern for the approach to this question throughout the army's subsequent history.
Political work was, and still is, regarded as a
totality which embraces all aspects of the army's
everyday life, of its cultural, educational, and
It also dictates the way in
sparetime activities.
which relations between the army and the civilian
population, and within the army itself between
officers and men, are handled. 38
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Not the least of Mao's precepts was that of
proper "relations between the

army and the civilian population," exemplified by
the Three Cardinal Rules of

Discipline conceived just prior to the Kutien speech,
probably jointly by Mao
and the Red Army's first corrmander, Chu Teh: 39

Obey all orders.
Take nothing from the peasants.
Pool all confiscated goods.

1.

2.

3.
It

was the landlords who were to be made to suffer, not the
peasants whom they

had been grinding into the dust.

Edgar O'Bal lance is instructive on Mao's

wisdom on this subject:
Mao Tse-tung, the far-seeing, peasant -minded
politician, evolved certain rules of conduct to be
observed toward the peasants.
The main rules
were that the peasants were to be treated with
cour tesy nothing mus t be taken from them unless it
was first paid for, and anything borrowed must be
promptly returned. This was a novel and unusual
approach for Chinese soldiers to adopt. ... To
the Chinese mercenary soldier the Chinese peasant
was the lowest form of life, and this opinion was
reciprocated heart i ly by the peasants themselves
The two were chasms apart, and now Mao Tse-tung
was not only trying to bring them together but
eventually to integrate them. 4 ®
.

.

.

,

.

.

.

.

Mao's organization for political control of the armed forces was (and
remains) a two-tiered hierarchy:

a party corrmittee, with no formal links to

the military authorities, which co-exists on every level with the military

structure but is

i

ndependent of it; and a political hierarchy integral to the

army (wi th counterparts today in the navy and air force) which
levels

is

found at al

1

from the General Political Department at PLA Headquarters to the

regimental Political Office (see Chart

1

on the following page).

But what of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists?

On

9

July 1926, Chiang became the Corrmander- in-Chie f

,

or Generalissimo

(as he liked to be called), of the revolutionary army (KMT forces which still

)

:

Chart

)

1
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Political Control Structure
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(chcng-chih
chih- tooyuan)

Platoon

Cell

4
m
Political

«-

Fighter

(hsiao-tsu)

(
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Source

John Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army London, Oxford
University, Oxford University Press, 9 6 7 p. 306.
;

i

,
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included the comnunist elements) and inmediately
comnenced the Northern

Campaign, or Expedition, an effort to defeat the
nor them war lords and unify
China.

With the nucleus he had developed at

Nationalist

and

comnunist,

he

beginning with Canton and

its

the Whampoa Academy,

had cleared and consolidated

environs.

Whether

the

Chiang had

eliminate the comnunists from the outset of his northern drive
debate

;

nonetheless

,

within less than

both

South,

plans
is

to

open to

he was bashing them wherever he

a year

found them.
On 27 March 1927, Chiang'

troops sacked Nanking, destroying a great

s

deal of foreign-owned property.

It

has been al leged that this was done at the

inst igat ion of the conrnunist political officers who were at large in the city
(

and still were integral to the KMT forces) in the hope of widening the breach

between Chiang

and

foreign governments

.4

1

Understandably,

powers already were less than pleased with Chiang'
Soviets and their advisers.

In any case

col laborated with the comnunists

,

s

the Western

arrangements with the

Chiang knew that as long as he

Russian or Chinese

,

he would get little of

the help he so desperately needed from the West.

On

12

April,

Chiang's

attacked the corrmuni s ts there

Nationalists,
,

killing some

5

already

occupying

Shanghai,

,000 in three days .42

The purge

cont inued wi th the removal of all persons suspected of comnunist sympathies

from positions of authority.

Chiang then made a blunder which would prove to

have repercussions of seismic proport ions--he ordered the abolition of all

political officers in his armed forces.
tion of wh i ch

(

This was a mi stake--the rectifica-

as we shall see ) a quar ter -century later gave the Nat ional

i

sts

internal security but came too late to affect the situation, ever, in mainland

China--a mistake which the "Generalissimo" undoubtedly regretted bitterly

^

,.

27

until, still unable to return "home" after yet
another quarter-century, he

died in virtual exile on Taiwan.

systematized,

Not the least of what Chiang lost was
the

propagandi s t ic appeal

to

the

Chinese peasants

for

their

support, an appeal which Mao developed to perfection
in his later campaigns

against the Japanese as well as the Nationalists.
After a bloody and seemingly successful campaign which
lasted until the

early simmer of 1927 and left Mao and his followers, battered
and bleeding
(but not out), sheltering in the Hankow area, Chiang felt
strong enough to

break with the Russ ans and consolidate his anti -corrmun
i

i

st

camp

On 27 July

.

Borodin and Blucher (Galen)43 were expelled from China and their
fellow

Russian advisers either went with them or were arrested.

Predictably, as a

result of all this, Chiang did begin to receive some help in money and suppl ies

from foreign powers

.

Thinking he had delived

a

decisive blow against the conmunists, Chiang

continued his campaign against the northern warlords.
short-lived.

advisers

,

By

the Reds

1930,
,

when he was

es tabl

i

receiving

the

His optimism was

first

his

of

German

shed firmly in various parts of China with amain

base in the region bordering Kiangsi and Fukien provinces and operating in
small semi

-

i

ndependent units, commenced their guerrilla operations.

rigid political control and guided by Mao

'

s

Under

four "Golden Rules of Warfare,"*

they successfully survived the first four of Chiang's five "extermination"

Although Mao, in time, became a master strategist these rules may have
When
In any case they are:
originated with Chu Teh, the older strategist.
avoids
ts--we
harass
the enemy advances--we retreat;
hal
1 was when the Reds failed to
retreats--we follow
bat 1 1 e--we attack;
extermination
campaign) in the
the
fifth
follow this guidance (as during
See Edgar
suffered
for
it.
they
earlier stages of the civil war that
1962 pp. 47 & 67
O' Ba lance s The Red Army of China London Faber & Faber
*

.

.

1

'

.

.

.

;

.

.

,

,

1

,

.

.

.
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campaigns

;

and whi le doing so prospered by capturing a great
deal of equipment

and thousands of Nationalist soldiers, turning
most of the equipment and

a

large number of the prisoners to their own purposes.

The fifth extermination campaign, begun in 1933
and orchestrated by the

German General Von Seeckt and involving nearly a million
of Chiang’s men
(against

about

succeeded. 45

200,000 Reds

in

the

Kiangsi

and Oyuwan

Soviets)

almost

After a campaign lasting twelve months, the Reds, hopelessly

encircled and forced more and more to fight in position defense (contra
Mao's

Golden Rules), broke out in September 1934 and, marching some 6,000
mi les through twelve provinces over a year

with the bulk of their forces.

'

s

time

,

-

8,000

escaped to northwest China

Although losses on the march generally were

severe, the corrmunists wasted no time in reconstituting their forces.
six months after his arrival in Szechuan, Hsu Hs i an-ch

'

i

en

Only

commanding the

,

Red Fourth Front Army which left the Oyuwan area in 1934 with between 50,000

and 60,000 men, had increased that army's strength to more than 100,000.^
This great event, claimed as a victory by both sides, has been written

down indel ibly under the rubric "The Long Marches"
"The Long March"

;

1 i

of ten mi

s

taken y ca 1 led
1

there were three main bodies--the First, Second and Fourth

Front Armies--which left at different
A1 though mi

(

times and took different

routes).

tary historians may claim that this was a partial victory for Von

Seeckt and the Nationalists, or a partial defeat for the corrmunists, no one

denies that this "great escape" led eventually, but decisively,

Kai-shek's ultimate defeat.

to

Chiang

To the value of the sheer numbers who escaped

one must add the less tangible and less obvious but extremely important fact
that the enterprise provided a tremendous psychological boost to corrmunist

^
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Itisa

solidarity.

fact also that fol lowing their victorious civil war
most

of the top members of party and government in Corrrnunist
China under Mao had

participated, as did he, in The Long Marches.

According to Chalmers Johnson "(t)he role played by the Japanese
Army in

bringing the Chinese Conmunists to power has never been fully appreciated by
foreign observers (but) resistance to Japan provided the corrmon
ground on

which cooperation between Corrmunists and peasants was based. "47

Although

"foreign observers" may not have agreed at the time of Johnson's writing
(around 1960)

,

John Gittings did a few years later.

Gittings cites the same

passage from Johnson and goes on to say that "Japanese hostilities against the

communist areas

.

.

.

coupled with the effect of their propaganda which

continually identified communism as the main enemy in China, only served to
increase the existing support

Johnson's elaboration

is

for

the Chinese

corrmunists ."48

Chalmers

worthy of quotation at length,

Japan's invasion and occupation of China
decisively altered the political interests of the
peasantry.
Prior to 1937, the peasants were a
passive element in politics
The prewar
peasant was absorbed in local matters and had only
the dimmest sense of "China."
Japan's invasion
changed this condi t ion by heightening the peasant s
interest in such concepts as national defense,
citizenship, treason, legitimacy of government,
and the long-range betterment of the Chinese state
Peasant mobilization in response to the
Japanese menace combined with the Communist readiness to lead the nationalistic upsurge in the
countryside, was the essential ingredient in the
wartime Communi s t -peasant alliance.

....

'

.

.

.

.

,

According to Edgar Snow, Franklin Houn tells us, Chou En-lai told him (Snow)
in

1936 that:

30

(A) 1 though the Communists wanted to end the
civil war and unite with the Koumintang to resist
Japan, they had no intention of abandoning the
revolution, but rather hoped to advance it, saying,
"The first day of the ant i -Japanese war will mean
the beginning of the end for Chiang Kai-shek. 50

Following the Japanese invasion of China in July 1937, Chiang was

compelled to agree to form a second united front with the Reds.

An agreement

was signed for a joint Communist-Nationalist war against Japan and the Red

Army was reorganized into the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies (but with
polwar organizations intact) under Chiang's nominal command.

The "union"

lasted until 1940 when cooperation broke down following Chiang's attack on
the New Fourth Army, when he alleged that

orders. 51

Each side had cherished the hope that through engagement with the

Japanese the other side would be weakened
that

with

they had refused to obey his

the

tremendous

peasant

.

What Chiang finally realized was

support

were

they

receiving

countryside the communists were growing much stronger,

not

in

the

weaker.

As

O'Ballance puts it:
The Nationalist attack on the 4th Route Army
caused the final break in the thin veneer of the
United Front, and from January 1941 until 1945,
there was what amounted to an armed truce between
the Reds and the Nationalists.
Each left the other
alone
Chiang Kai-shek had decided upon a
policy of containing the Reds, hoping meanwhile
2
that the Japanese would destroy them.

....

As to the United Front per se

,

Townsend and Womack present

a

most up-to-date

opinion:
The real significance of the second United
Front was not, then, meaningful cooperation with
the KMT, which was never realized, but rather its
Superfiimpact on the Communi st Revolut ion
cially, the United Front appeared to suggest cooperation between two parties, each representing a
different class base; in fact, the CCP used it to
establish itself as the leader of a truly national
.

movement 53
.

.

.

.

31

After Pearl Harbor, Chiang relied on American
aid.

A state of armed

watchfulness existed between the Nationalists and
conmunists until the end of
the war by which time the Reds claimed an army
of nearly one million 54
.

Despite mediation efforts by US representatives such
as George Marshall and

Ambassador Hurley in 1945 (Marshall effected
from January until July 1946) the civi

1

a

shaky cease-fi re which lasted

war re-erupted and despite US aid the

Nationalists were defeated, first in Manchuria then throughout
China.

With

the inexorable disintegration of his armies, Chiang
resigned as President in

January 1949, leaving his Vice President,

Li

Tsung-jen, in charge as acting

President until the absolute and bitter end in the Fall.
Taiwan,

but

not without

some thought

for

his

future.

Chiang fled to
Edgar O'Bal lance

describes how
Chiang Kai-shek saw defeat in sight and began
to prepare a safe refuge and retreat on the island of
Formosa, to which he moved the gold reserves, many
of his best troops, his air force and the bulk of the

modern American equipment that remained to him.
The U.S.A. was now distinctly cool towards him and
military aid had tailed off. Stripping the mainland to fortify Formosa, he left Li, the acting
President, to hold out against the Reds as best he
could. 55

This showed perhaps more discretion than Hitler did a few year earlier under

somewhat similar circumstances.
On

1

October 1949 theestabl ishment of the People'

s

Republ ic of China was

announced and "the new year 1950 found the uncouth, unsophisticated (but

politically oriented),

open-mouthed PLA,

nearly

4

1/2 million

strong,
ti

panting and triumphant, gazing in wonder at its own achievements."
It

is

5 6

interesting to note that from 1945 to 1949, when the KMT was so

decisively defeated on the mainland, its polwar system had been completely
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abandoned.

Military and political defeat were to be the basic
reasons for

the reinstitution of a rigid political
military system on the island of

Taiwan.

The

need

for

efficient, loya 1 mi

1 i

a

"carrier

vehicle"

develop and

to

sustain

an

tary force was obvious; the "vehicle" chosen was polwar.

The Latter Day Chinese Nationalist Polwar System

Faithful to the hoary Three People's Principles (San Min Chu

Yat-sen

-

nationalism, democracy and livelihood

I)

of Sun

Chiang Kai-shek reintro-

-

duced polwar to his armed forces (and ultimately, directly or indirectly, to
the entire populace of

the Republic of China).

Political Staff Col lege was founded

Whampoa Academy, on

1

,

The Chinese Nationalist

along the same lines as its ancestor

,

the

July 1951 and was given the mission

To train and qual i fy individuals to be politiwarfare officers, to be faithful to Threepeople-principles, obedient to their national
leader, and loyal to their country in addition to
being rich in the sense of responsibility and honor
so that they may undertake the mission of Anticommunist and Resist Russia which leads to national
cal

revival 57
.

Even taking into account the difficulty of transliteration to such an alien

language as English this Chinese passage

capitalization.

Ironically,

and

somewhat

chosen for the college originally was

a

is

interesting

ignominiously

,

,

its

the

use of

location

Japanese-built pre-World War Two

racetrack and the first "po lwar r ior s" began with only

ramshackle stables

in

along wi th a few hundred cadets

.

a ticket

office and some

Over the next ten years

there was significant improvement as shown by this statement from one of the

polwar staff officers at the school:
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The capacity of training has (been) raised
to
more than three-thousand students, ten times
the
number of trainees at the very inception of
the
college.
As to the construction, there are 183
buildings all over the campus which, in turn,
originated from several stables
we have
converted the former deserted racetrack into the
existing splendid Fu Hsing Kang, the cradle
of
political warfare workers. °

...

Fu Hsing Kang still produces polwar officers
(and NCOs

)

who though probably as

well-indoctrinated as their early predecessors are perhaps less
optimistic
about returning to reposses the mainland and ultimately
defeating Soviet

Russia.
The evolution of the ROC system from these early days into the complex

structure of today

is a

study of conceptual refinement whose basic impulse was

necessity; a necessity felt as
the mainland.

a

direct result of the Nationalist's defeat on

Clearly cognizant of the fact that the ROC military forces

needed motivation, indoctrination and purpose

defensive than offensive in recent

times)

if

a

cohesive combat (more

force was

Nationalist leadership developed, by the late 1950s,

a

to

formed,

be

the

comprehens ive organ-

ization whose mission was, and is, to make the ROC Armed Forces a more

effective instrument of national policy and to ensure
res pons ive body of troops.

a stable,

Fromthis objective flow many impl

i

reliable and

ci

t

f

unct ions

which include internal security, discipline, morale, sound civilian relations (one cannot help but recall Mao) and other allied areas.

Interestingly,

the

Chinese Nationalists

insist

upon dating

their

present polwar system from the establishment of Whampoa Academy in 1924 when
the combined or "united front" revolutionary army was created under Russian

supervision.

In

addition to crediting the Russian corrmunists, now their

mortal foes second only to the mainland Chinese

,

recogni tion

is

given also to

34

Confucius (attributable perhaps to the latent resentment
felt toward the "new
cultural movement" of 191559 which rejected
"Confucius and Sons" and many of

whose members

,

such as Mao Tse-tung

,

later espoused corrmuni sm)

,

the Germans

(Von Seeckt and company of the early 1930s), and even
the United States (the

major provider of military and economic aid).
Department (GPWD) briefing of 1964 says

A General Political Warfare

thusly:

it

It (the ROC Polwar System) has deep roots in
Confucianism.
It was forged as a revolutionary
instrument under Russian guidance, was influenced
by subsequent German advisors, and has in the past
decade been in a state of evolution. This state of
evolution has been characterized by a responsiveness to United States philosophy and training out of
proportion to the understanding, advice and assistance from the United States. 0

An interesting statement, especially in view of the fact that the United

States,

though

it

supported polwar in both Nationalist China and South

Vietnam, never had an official "philosophy" about the subject, gave none of
the training,

understood little about polwar per se and therefore could

pr ov i de little advice

.

Ass i stance

,

i

n the forms of

money and equipment

,

was

given in abundance.
The Nationalists go on to claim that

it

was polwar which enabled them to

defeat "numerical ly superior forces" (the warlords) as well as to "achieve a

brilliant

record

in

such campaigns

as

operation and in the war against Japan. "6!

.

.

.

the Communist

Suppression

They claim also that

it was the

abolition of the system, caused by the Communists, "after World War II,"

which led to their downfall.

The official position is stated thusly:

After World War II the Chinese Communists,
being aware of the influence of the political
warfare establishment within the Chinese Armed
Forces, did everything possible to undermine and
discredit our activities. The Chinese Communist

.

.
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activities led to the abolition of the political
warfare establishment in the Chinese Armed
Forces.
Corrmunist agents were then able to corrupt
theminds
of our troops to incite the masses and to
waver the
strong fighting will of our troops. Under
the
circumstances, we were not able to fight the enemy
fist with fist and toe to toe.
As a result of this
bitter lesson, President Chiang determined in 1950
to re-es tab i sh the political warfare system
in our
armed forces. 62
,

1

Not only is this statement reductive, it is ridiculous.
if taken out of context, is valid.

Of course, to be fair, it can be cited as a

seminal example of the practice of polwar
it

The last sentence,

.

Whatever Chiang may have claimed,

was his abolition of the position of political officers following
the

"Nanking Incident" in

1

927 which caused hi

s

system to become

,

if not

morbid,

dormant until its revival in 1950.
The stated mission of the ROC polwar organization is:

"To make the

Armed Forces a more effective instrument for implementation of national
policies derived from the democratic principles (nationalism, democracy and
1 i

ve 1 ihood) taught by Dr

.

Sun Yat-sen."63

From this mission statement seven

principles are derived, which are to:64
1.

Instill in the minds of servicemen the
principles for which they fight.

2.

Improve teamwork and unity within the armed
forces

3.

Provide security against enemy subversion.

4.

Improve leadership capabilities of unit
commanders

5.

Nurture morale and welfare of the armed
forces and their dependents.

6.

Supervise enforcement of discipline in the
armed forces.

7.

Promote understanding and cooperation between
the armed forces and civilians.

1
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Taking the mission and objectives together
say the Chinese,

surmary

"a

statement can perhaps be made that the General
Political Warfare Department
is

primari ly charged with providing the commander
with a stable and respon-

sive body of troops which in turn provides the
national government with a

stable and responsive instrument for pursuit of national
pol icy. "65
be

reminded of

this

quintessential

statement

in

our

We wi

discussion of

1

the

Egyptian armed forces later in this thesis.
As to organization for polwar

ROC st ructure wi

1 1

detail with its

,

only a brief, general description of the

be necessary since the next part of this thesis wi

deal in

1 1

country cousin," the South Vietnamese system.

The Republic of China General Political Warfare Department is a staff

organization directly under the Ministry of National Defense and

is

subject

to the supervision of the Chief of the General Staff (the equivalent of the

Cha i rman of the Joint Chi e fs of Staff in the Uni ted States) as shown
on the following page.

t

n Chart 2

The staff and the unit organizations which execute

the ROC political warfare mission, at all leve 1

Western military

i

organizations.

s

of command

,

are not common to

Whi le the ROC armed forces do have opera-

ional staffs which closely paral lei those of the USmilitary structure, they

have also a staff system des igniated by the let ter "P" (P-1 through P-6
is

)

which

responsible for both "external" missions, such as psychological warfare

activities and civil affairs matters, as well as with all of the multifaceted

environmental factors that affect the attitudes of the individual members of
the armed forces (see Chart

3

on page 38 and Appendices

1

and

2

)

.

Also, under

the di rect Command of MND and the supervision of GPWD are sixteen support ing

or operational units responsible for polwar assignments (see Appendix 3).

Chart

2
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COMMAND AND ORGANIZATION OF

ALL-LEVEL POLITICAL WARFARE UNITS
IN THE CHINESE ARMED FORCES

This chart shows
tion of the

Armed

how

Forces.

the political warfare establishment

The General

Political

organizations directly under the Ministry of
the General Staff, at the

MND

level

is

responsible for overall planning

A

political

Armed

warfare department,

Forces.

is

and

Warfare

National

fits

into the overall organiza-

Department,

Defense and subject

one of the
to the

the top level political warfare establishment.

supervision of political warfare activities at

section, or officer

is

assigned to each

command

staff

Chief of

GPWD

all levels.

within the

Chart

3
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ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF
THE GENERAL POLITICAL WARFARE DEPARTMENT, MND

organization of the

This chart sh;ws the

can be seen, the

and

the

Political

Armed

*

GPWD

composed of

Office

Administrative

Warfare

is

Planning

in

six

General
operating

addition to the

Committee.

Political

warfare

2

Warfare

elements, the

Military

pattern.
Forces follow this same organizational

See Appendix

Political

Department.

Comptroller

Spokesman's

establishments at

As

Office,

Office and the
all levels

of the
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As noted earlier,

the association of the word "political"
with the

military often creates a mental block (at best)

in the

Westerner

particu-

,

larly in the USmilitary advi ser (about whom mo re will be said
later).

With a

strong display of understandable, if not justifiable,
ethnocentr i sm, the
corrmon reaction of the Westerner has been, and unfortunately
continues to be,

to equate ROC and RVNAF (Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces)
with the US Army

framework.

Although this can be done to some extent (see Chart

4)

what must

be kept in mind is the fact that the entire reason for the establishment of
any

polwar system is to consolidate all the activities and personnel and even

equipment dedicated to the accomplishment of the polwar mission into

homogeneous,

possibly elite,

if

you will,

organization of

a

trained and

unquestionably loyal experts who are responsive to the direct supervision of
a chief

who

is

directly under or perhaps even part of the national government.

Not the least benefit of having a direct chain to the very seat of government
i

s

the assurance of adequate and proper funding within the fiscal budget i ng of

the nation's military forces.

This is not to say that the system, particu-

larly in "free world" countries, should be autonomous

;

the dangers of having

such a system are obvious; eventually the sponsoring government would find

itself "hoist on its own petard."
In

addition to approaching what

is

largely an "Eastern" concept with a

"Western" viewpoint the spectre of "political corrmissar" immediately arises
and looms large

,

especial ly in the minds of Amer icans who have been bred in an

atmosphere of naive isolationism (although some twisted hope may lie in
governmental debacles such as Watergate and the Iran-contra affair).
too

i

s

under s tandab 1 e

of the concept.

,

espec i a

1 1

y in view of the Ch i nese Corrmuni

st

This

adapt at ion

But the Chinese Communists developed their polwar system

Chart

4
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Comparison Between
Staffs in

Political

Warfare

Staffs

and US General and Special

Connection with Their Authorities and
Responsibilities

Here on

this chart the left column shows the responsible political warfare section, the
column shows the responsible U.S. staff section, and the center column shows the
common funtions. As can be readily seen the political warfare staff funtions in the Chinese

right

Armed

Forces and those in the

difference

lies

only in

the

organization while the latter

U.S.

name of
is

general and special staffs are similar in nature.
the

organization.

The former

handled separately by different staff

is

centralized

offices.

in

The
one
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into a structure which supercedes the formal and traditional
mi

chain.

the corrmander
a

tary conmand

Neither the ROC nor RVNAF systems placed the polwar
officer over or

even equal to the cotrmander

is

1 i

,

In this sense polwar is a

.

supporting arm which

if he is prudent, can use to better accomplish

hismission.

It

fact that the Chinese "P" staff maintains a separate
corrmuni cat ions

channel;

however,

the

political

officer

is,

subordinated to the corrmander, at all levels.

both

in

theory

and

fact,

He is an "operator" in the

truest sense of the word, but only "for" the corrmander.

Unquestionably, Chiang Kai-shek learned a hard lesson.
reported

to

have

once

said

that

"the

loss

of

In fact

Mainland

the

,

he is

(China)

attributable 70% to political factors and 30% to military factors and that
can be

regained only by concentration of effort

Although Chiang'

s

in

the

same

is
it

ratio. "66

percentages may be questionable the fervor with which he

established and then developed his General Political Warfare Department
reveals virtually an obsessive impulse to consolidate and ensure the future

loyalty of not only the members of his armed forces but of the civilian

populace living with him in his exile.

His legacy continues.

major objection to the GPWD (among many Westerners as well as
number of the Taiwanese),
recognized; but

it

that

it

an

is

In fact, the
a

significant

instrument of the KMT, must be

must also be evaluated in the relation to the environment

within which the armed forces and the KMT (ROC) exist.

Favorable points

which may be considered are the steady progress of both the ROC armed forces
and the civilian economy,
budget.

Considering

the

in

spite of the country's staggering defense

present

status

re 1 at i onsh ip with the civilian corrmuni

itself,

it

is

t

of

the

ROC armed

y and the condi

t

forces,

its

ion of that corrmuni t y

difficult not to credit the polwar concept to some extent.

CHAPTER

II

-

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES POLWAR

Introduct ion
As necessity promoted the development of the ROCpolwar
concept, so also

was

it

the prime stimulant for South Vietnamese interest in the
system.

By

1960, communist pressure had reached a level which the Republic of
Vietnam

found intolerable.

The military forces of the Republic were, during this

period, trying to accomplish two difficult missions:
and train leaders and units.

fight the communists

Either of these tasks, particularly for a new

military establishment, would have been difficult.

To

accomplish both

simultaneously was inf ini tely more complex and frustrating.

Recognising

the potential importance of the armed forces of the Republic as a stabilizing

formal institution in national affairs, the Diem government established a

political warfare school in Saigon.

The philosophical underpinnings of the

school were derived from a uniquely Vietnamese brand of humanism which was

envisioned as a counter for communist ideology.

This was not the "secular

humanism" of which one hears more and more today; rather than

philosophy oriented exclusively toward man,
brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu

with

,

it

a "Western"

was, as developed by Diem's

an admixture of Christianity and patriotism, seasoned

liberal soupcon of Buddhism, Taoism and Confucian ethics.

a

The Political warfare School trained selected Republic of Vietnam Armed
Forces

(

RVNAF

)

psycho log i ca 1 warfare officers in indoc t r inat ion concepts and

techniques while inculcating the humanistic concepts of Nhu. 67

Beyond the

fact that the school had an adequate advisory staff from the Republ ic of China

there exists no information that indicates the students were really trained
for anything beyond conventional psychological warfare activities.
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November 1963 marked not only the end of the Di
em government but also the
end of the first "formal" polwar effort in
the Republic of Vietnam.

polwar

school

continued

to

operate but without

the

support

of

The

senior

governmental officials, a situation which continued
until May, 1964, when
reconrmendat ion was made through RVNAF channe 1

s

a

to develop a system within the

armed forces similar to that which existed in the
Republic of China.

This

recommendation was endorsed by both the RVN Minister of Defense
and Paul
Harkins, Commander

,

US Military Advisory Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV)

,

and

later, upon his replacing Harkins, by General Westmoreland.

Following a senior level liaison visit by RVN and US officials to the
Repub 1 ic of China speci f ic recorrmendat ions were made and later actual i zed by
the es tabl i shment of the RVNAF General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) in

November

,

1964

.

Interestingly, this was not an isolated action, but rather

was a part of a broad reorganization within the RVNAF.

Finalization and

implementation were realized by General Executive Decree 152-QP on 24 July
1965.68

This instrument established the General Political Warfare Depart-

ment as an integral part of the RVNAF at Joint General Staff level.
The mission statement of GPWD was to study, prepare, and implement

polwar plans within the RVNAF relating to:

organizational,

strategic,

ideological, psychological, intelligence, and the peopl e

'

s

war f are 69
.

The

fact that these six approaches are almost identical with Chiang Kai-shek's

"Six Great Warfares," leads to the prompt conclusion that the ROC method was

integrated into the RVNAF in toto.
elements

which were

considered

to

In fact,

be

such was not the case; those

compatible with

South

requirements were adopted, those that were not were discarded.
of RVN Polwar was uniquely Vietnamese, though, as

I

Vietnam's

The essence

mentioned earlier, the

organization and staff structure were remarkably similar to the ROC system.

,
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The RVNAF polwar system was an organizational
attempt to solve basic

problems such as ensuring loyalty to the constituted
government and improving

civil-military relations.

The specific functional areas of responsibility

assigned to the GPWD included:

troop indoctrination and mot ivat ion

,

troop

and dependant welfare, civil affairs, psychological
warfare, and security.
In

priority order, the GPWD was concerned wi th RVNAF personnel,
civilians

hostile and friendly areas, and enemy troops.

Simply stated the polwar

mission was to create and maintain the loyalty of the RVNAF
nation and national ideology

,

in

to its leaders,

to gain and maintain the support of the civi

1

ian

population in both friendly and enemy controlled areas, and to destroy the
loyalty of enemy troops to their leaders, nation and national ideology.
sun,

In

the long range goal was to achieve a cohesiveness among the various

ethnic, linguistic, religious and ideological (political) groups in all of

Vietnam in order to bring about national unity.
under the circumstances!

Rather ambitious a task,

One cannot help but think of the crude metaphor

about being sent to drain a swamp which is full of very active alligators.
As in psychological opera t ions

,

and especial ly

i

ts favored instrument

propaganda, the polwar effort concentrates on people's attitudes, on trying
to induce certain behavior through influencing individual attitudes.

was the ultimate objective for all polwar efforts in Vietnam.

This

However, this

first requires close analysis of the individual and his values, desires and

needs (real and perceived) and beliefs; a difficult task under the best of

conditions.

To achieve an understanding of individuals an assessment and

analysis must be made of the groups to which these individuals belong.

The

research tools to accomplish this were available and to some degree were put
to use.
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Psychological operations officers in the
US and in the RVN--mainly

inadequate

for

the

task but

the best

the US could offer

as

far

as

any

orientation or understanding of polwar went-in
conjunction with US scholars
in the fields of politics, psychology,
sociology, economics and other related

disciplines were put to work.

The former were to learn about polwar, the

latter to conduct studies in their fields in
order to assist the GPWD in their

herculean task.

But already it was too late.

Probably several years would

have been required to plan and execute a successful
sys tem--several years

during peacetime, not war.

Instituting the system and fighting the war

simultaneously was impossible.

The US advisers (combat arms advisers, not

polwar) attached to the ARVN (the bulk of the RVNAF was its army) were neither
t

r

ai

ned nor suited for polwar oper a t ions.

In any

case

,

when one

i

s

faced with

continuing combat operations one hardly has time for anything else, especially some esoter ic "new" idea for winning the war

,

an idea which seems to offer

no irrmediate positive effect on the outcome of the fighting.

Added to all this was the fact that the central government itself was
corrupt,

thanks

in

representatives at

no
the

small

part

highest

to

level

the
of

inattention
the

(or

worse)

advisory effort.

of

US

Finally,

unlike corrmuni sm, there was no hard ideological product to "sell" by the South

Vietnamese political officers.

As ment ioned above

,

among the first priority

items in the three-fold polwar mission was the need to create and maintain

loyalty to a "national ideology."

Unlike their communist counterparts in

the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Army (who had polwar systems taken from
the Chinese communist model as early as 1938), the RVNAF "polwarr iors" could

only say in a negative sense that communism was not good for the Vietnamese.
The only alternative, in a positive sense, was some form of democracy

,

based
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probably on the American model which was thousands
of H_ (about one-third of a
mile) away from anything the average Vietnamese
understood. The Americans,
meanwhile,

could only say that

for

their part

they wanted

to help

the

Vietnamese establish "some sort of climate of freedom"
wherein the Vietnamese
people could, through some process of
"self-determination," decide how they

wanted to be governed.
very

s

To the corrmunists the answer was pre-packaged
and

impl e--conmun i sm was

the answer.

Despite its unfortunate fate the RVNAF polwar sys tan

is

worth examining.

Based upon its previous success historically polwar may have
had a chance of

succeeding in Vietnam had the circumstances in which
otherwise.

it

was attempted been

Before looking at its organizat ion and functions, however, its

three-fold mission is worthy of closer examination.

The Mission

Within the first part of the RVNAF'

maintain the loyalty of

the

RVNAF to

s

three- fold mi ss ion--to create and
its

leaders,

nation and national

ideology- -the re were a series of intermediate objectives.

The first of

these was to create the conditions under which a soldier can be expected to be
1

oya 1

is

i

.

If the

soldier

is

concerned about his food

worried about his family or feels that he

,

pay or living condi

is not

ndoc t r i na t i on and mot i va t i on programs cannot succeed

t

i

ons

,

being treated fairly,
.

Thus

,

a s i nee re and

apparent concern for the well-being of the soldier must be developed and

augmented with programs of troop and dependent welfare, entertainment, and
recreation.

Programs

first must

be

initiated

to

develop

a

reasonably

contented, healthy soldier, making every possible aspect of his life better.

Once this condition

is

achieved he should be receptive to the second step--
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motivation and indoctrination.

It after

completing these steps the soldier

still was not loyal to the government of
the RVN the third step--detection
and

"neutral izaion" or "removal" of the soldier to
prevent him from "contaminating" other soldiers

was to be taken.

Detection and neutral ization were to

be accomplished by the Military Security
Police, an integral part of the

GPWD.70
Within

this

process

two

approaches

are

envisioned:

indirect approach, and the individual or direct one.

the

group or

The first involves all

"impersonal" means of influencing the attitudes of soldiers,
including uni

t-

wide or army-wide information and recreation activities, and
materials

designed to improve the soldiers’ morale.
programs,

lectures, movies,

Examples are:

dependent we 1 fare

radio and televisional magazines and news-

papers, and sports and entertainment programs.

The second approach involves

various means of personal contact with the individual soldier.

It

is

refined system involving investigation, counselling and persuasion and

implemented by the polwar organization within the units.
about the techniques of this system later.

a
is

More will be said

For the moment it is enough to say

that this personal approach is one of the characteristics of polwar which set
it

apart as a unique system.

The second part of the polwar mission --to gain and maintain the support
of the civilian popul ace --had three intermediate ob jec t i ves wh ich

effective

,

had to be implemented sequential ly.

,

to be

mo s t

The first was to identi fy the

pro-government elements, usually a small minority, within the targeted

civilian group.

Once identified, these elements were organized and their

loyalty certified.

To accomplish the next objective these organized pro-

government elements were used to solicit support of the uncorrmitted or

.
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apathetic segment of the population, usually the
majority of the civilian
target group.

Psychological warfare media and civic action
projects were

used also to accomplish this objective.

When there was enough evidence that

the majority of the populace is behind the government
(effects analyses are
the most difficult part of all polwar

,

psyop, psywar operations, but the

outcome of RVNAF polwar makes this analysis necessarily
theoretical), this

majority was to be used to identify and expel or "neutralize" the non-loyal
or
pro-enemy elements which, assuning that the first two steps were successful

would now be a small minority.

In

,

Vietnam this final mission phase was

carried out primarily through the Revolutionary Development and Phoenix
programs; 72 the RVNAF, however, was to devote considerable attention to

gaining the support of the civilian populace for the national government.
The third part of the polwar mission was to break down the loyalty of the

enemy soldier to hi
the RVN cause.

s

leaders and cause him to desert and perhaps even rally to

This effort which was to have been accomplished mainly

through the use of psywar in support of military operations, also had three

sequential phases:

to identify and neutralize the enemy's cause; to divide

and destroy the enemy; and to organize and re-indoctr inate enemy returnees or

defectors

The Organization

The South Vietnamese system, though

country

'

s

it

failed along with the rest of the

armed forces was, as we shall see, extremely ambi t ious and broad in

concept and organization, and there are those who feel

that

it

was

the

fundamental error of trying to superimpose such an advanced and sophisticated
sys

tern

on an armed force that was al ready fighting for its very lifewhich made
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any success impossible and actual ly may have
hastened the corrmunist victory.
A "cruder"

approach under such dire circumstances may
have proven more

effective, as in the example of Russia.

In

defense of the effort itself

it

must be said that some systemat ization wi thin the South
Vietnamese forces was
essential as even the kindest appraisals of corruption,
desertion, maltreat-

ment of enlisted personnel and all other soldierly ills
reveal. 73

in any

case it is my opinion that the Vietnamese system "fell under
its own weight"
(aided greatly in that fall by the lack of understanding of
the As i an mind and
lack of interest in anything political manifested by the great
majority of
.American commanders of high rank)
ci rcumstances the

have said (and wi

properly at

the

.

This is not to say that givenmore serene

Vietnamese could not have worked out a viable system.
1 1

say again later in this work)

right

time

could

be

the

established government trying to survive in

,

I

such a system, if emplaced

salvation
a

As

of

legitimately

a

"developing" nation.

The General Political Warfare Department was a major subdivi s ion of the

RVNAF Joint General Staff

,

and was a joint services organization headed by an

army major general whose staff, based again upon the preponderance of army
forces within the RVNAF
the Republ ic of China

,

cons i s ted almost entirely of army personnel

,

there were two main types of polwar cadre

:

.

As in

those under

the direct command of the GPWD and those located in regular service units

(again

,

mainly army)

,

schools, training centers

,

or support organizations.

These latter were under the command of the officer commanding the unit to

which they were ass igned

.

Political warfare was a service branch and as such

had equal status with the other branches such as infantry, artillery and so
forth, at

least

theoretically, and its officers manned the GPWD and its

subordinate organizations as well as the polwar staffs of the schools,

s)

.
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training centers, support orgainzat ions and
regular mi
regimental level and higher.

In

1 i

tary "line" units at

strict accordance with the integrated
or

unified system, the polwar officers at company
and battalion level were

considered members of the branch of that particular
element
artillery, etc.)

to which

they were assigned.

(infantry,

Their polwar duties were

considered secondary to the primary operational mi

tary mi ss ion

1 i

The main division of the GPWD organization follows the
division of its

cadre into two parts:

the GPWD and its subordinate organizations,
and the

polwar organization within other military units or

agencies.

We will

consider them in that order.

The General Political Warfare Department
The Gene r al Political Wa r f a r e Depar tmen t

(

Char t

5

on the foil owi ng page

consisted of its chief, three deputies, its staff and departments,

a

polwar

college and several operational units.
Whi le the deputy Chief for Troops Action was responsible for developing
long range programs for

t

roopmot ivat ion and indoctrination, the Deputy Chief

for Civic Action and Enemy Action was responsible for developing long-range

civic act ion and psywar programs

;

the Deputy Chief for RF/PF was responsible

for polwar activities within the regional and popular forces

militia;

the

regional

forces were equivalent

to

(

South Vietnam'

fairly well

trained US

National Guard troops, the popular forces were mainly local irregulars).

These special staff members reported directly to the Chief, GPWD.

Chart

5
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.
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The regular staff included:

an Organizat ion Branch, which was
respons-

ible for preparing tables of organization
and equipment, training and the

polwar organization generally; a Plans Branch,
responsible for preparing
long range polwar and psychological warfare
plans; an Inspection Branch which

monitored the activities of the entire GPWD
organization for indications of
misuse of office, corruption, or negligence of
duties; an Information and
Public Relations Branch mainly responsible for
the release of military

information to the civilian news media; a Sports and
Gymnastic Branch which

administered unit sports programs and managed military teams which
entered
international competitions; a Budget Branch; and an Administration
Branch

which managed the routine administration of the GPWD.
The GPWD departments were those of Political Indoctrination and Training,

Psywar, Military Security,

separate Directorates:

Social Service, and Chaplains

Catholic,

Buddhist and Protestant).

three

(as

The Polwar

College made up the final "department" or element within the GPWD staff
structure.
The operational or field elements of the GPWD included five polwar

battalions and attendant mass comnuni cat ions media.
tions media,

cultural

including radio,

activities,

The mass corrmunica-

television, printing, motion picture, and

were under

the operational

control

of

the

Psywar

Department
The Political

three-fold

Indoctrination and Training Department of GPWD had the

mission

of:

education,

promoting high

personnel;

preparing

preparing
ideals,

political

plans

which

and building

indoctrination

developed

the morale

training

political
of military

programs;

and

.
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enhancing troop moraie through eamand
and leadership activities
aimed at
fostering enthusiasm, discipline, unity,
an opt imi
st ic at

t

i

tude and a wi

1

1

to

fight

The concept of political

indoctrination grew out of the need
for a

standard ideology which would not change with
each change of government.
ideology stressed the three principles 01
of country
eountrv
H

honor andj res pons ibi

,

The
1 i

ty

(as in the "duty, honor, country" of the US
Military Academy at West Point).

The soldier was taught that his country had
a glorious history with brave

heroes who fought against overwhelming odds, and
since his country had such
past the soldier had a responsibility to fight for

present danger.

it

and protect

it

a

from any

He was taught to believe it was an honor for him
to be a

citizen of his country during its struggle for an independent
democracy.

He

was told for whom and what he was fighting and why he could be
confident of
final victory.

religion,

He was taught that he was fighting for his country and not a

political

alleviate his

party,

traditional

government operates.

individual
fear

of

evil

leader

or

rulers,

group of
he was

leaders.

taught

To

how the

He was taught also that respect for private citizens

will build stronger ties of loyalty between the citizenry and soldiery.

Indoctrination involved the study of printed materials and discussions
to

ensure

a

thorough understanding of the subjects.

motion pictures, poetry, plays, music, visits

Radio,

to historic sites

occupied by hostile forces) and competitive events were used
the program.
to

include

television,
(unless

to supplement

Political education was concerned wi th ideological guidance,

theories

of

revolution,

explanation

of

national

policies,

ana lyses of current events and criticism of hostile ideologies (in the case of
the RVN, communism).
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The Political Indoctrination and Training
Department was organized into
five branches--Plans, Political Education,
Uni

t

Act ivi

t

ies

,

Administration,

and Motivation Indoctrination Program--and also had
operational control of
the Polwar Training Center in Saigon (see Chart

6

on the fol lowing page)

.

The

Training Center in Saigon trained those officers already
on active duty whose
duties

required polwar knowledge.

offered two courses of instruction:

Established in May,

the center

1967,

The Polwar Staff Officer Course and the

Deputy Company Commander -Pol war Officer Course (to fill requirements
for the
unified system at lower echelons).
but effectually equivalent

allotted each week

.

course were doubled.

I

n

Each course was of five weeks duration

to eight

March

,

1969,

weeks of training due to the hours
the

t

imes

(hours) allotted for each

The polwar cadets at the College at Dalat would enter

active service after their studies were completed, having chosen polwar as
their career field.

Upon graduation these newly

corrmi ss ioned

co-equal status ad rank wi th graduates of the RVNAF Mi

co-located at Dalat.

officers had

tary Academy which was

1 i

A1 though they were given some instruction in polwar and

were politically indoctrinated and educated to

degree,

a

these

latter

officers entered the traditional military branches of service.
The Psychological Warfare Department engaged in activities contributing to the accomplishment of all three GPWD mi ss ions

.

Most of the Depart-

ment's effort was, however, directed toward the first target audience, the
RVNAF, to include the regional and popular forces.
the

civilian

populace and

the

enemy.

The

Secondary targets were

primary

objectives

of

this

department were to develop broad thematic approaches, plans and doctrine for

Chart

6

55

DEPARTMENT

®

TRAINING

MIP

AND

INDOCTRINATION

TRAINING

SCHOOL

POLWAR
POLITICAL

i

CO

s
CO
25

3
CL

M
§
E-

jp;

co

•»

<a

g
e

3
a,
>

>
a
2
O
KH

%
M
H
5

a
2
B
o
K
CO

5

56

national psywar and civic action programs, to
supervise the implementation of
these programs, and to provide the corrmuni cat
ions media support for the

accomplishment of developed programs.
The thematic approaches used in the late 1960s in Vietnam
were based upon
the national

objectives enumerated by President Thieu in his

address of January, 1967.74

inaugural

At that time he announced broad objectives for

the next four years and the basic themes which he hoped would
contribute to

their

accompl i shment--peace

,

democracy

and

social

reform.

The

Psywar

Department adapted these themes to different approaches to each target

audience and these basic thematic approaches provided the broad guidance
wi thin which all psywar messages were developed, with the possible exception

of some tactical psywar activities which called for the irrmediate exploita-

tion of local situations.

The Psywar Department

,

an integral part of GPWD, includes four divisions

and a coordination center, as shown in Chart

7

on the following page.

The Social Service Department was created for and charged with the

mission of providing social welfare support to all military and civilian
personnel within the Ministry of Defense and their dependents.

In this role

the Department was responsible for the staff supervision and support of the

Social Sections in all military units, organizations, hospitals, schools and

training centers in the RVNAF.

Welfare Division;
other s--Admini

s

t

this

The key element in the Department was the

division conducted

rat ion and Finance,

social

operations while

the

Plans and Inspection, and the Social

Service Training School --played supporting roles (see Chart

8

)

.

The entire

headquarters existed solely to support the field units, staffed by women
trained at the Social Service Training School.

There were ten types of

Chart
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Chart
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SOCIAL SERVICE DEPARTMENT

.
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Social Service Sections ranging from a social
service office of twenty-five
to a team of two.

Social Service Assistants were stationed in
each dependent

housing area and in each headquarters down to regimental
and provincial
leve

1

Social Service Assistants cared for the soldier's family
while he was

away from home.

If

he was killed, or hospitalized, his family could look to

the Social Service Assistant for help.

Obviously, a soldier will fight more

effectively knowing that his government cares what happens to his family.
The welfare support mission was carried out through six main programs:

assistance in kind, assistance in cash, education, medical and maternity
care, youth activities, and self-help programs.

The distribution of "morale and welfare packets" was the most corrmon

activity associated with the assistance in kind program (see Chart
packets' composition and intended beneficiaries)

.

led or hospi tal ized

1

servicemen none was made for those of captured personnel.
statistics for the ARVN were staggering during the war
and while

it

was

true

that

for the

Of interest was the fact

that while some provision was made for the fami lies of ki

end,

9

,

The desertion

especial ly toward its

many soldiers deserted out

of

fear,

frustration or plain "homesickness" and many others went home to help with
harvests or when
i

a fami ly

crisis arose

ty or death in the irrmediate fami ly)

the other side.

(

,

such as childbirth, spousa 1 inf ide 1 -

many RVN soldiers simply went over to

Also knowing that there was no compensation for prisoner of

war status probably was seen by RVN leaders as an incentive to ARVN soldiers to
resist capture.
Of the two types of cash assistance the first covered hardships in the
fami ly such as birth of a child, death of a family member

,

natural disasters

and cases of special hardship not covered by the categories above; the second

Chart
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SOCIAL SERVICE DEPARTMENT
"MORALE AND WELFARE PACKETS"
1.
Packet for KIA's. Each family of a KIA is entitled to
cloth.
This is used in the traditional funeral ceremony.

Packets for hospitalized servicemen.
of wounds or injuries, is entitled to:
2.

5

meters of white

Each serviceman, hospitalized because

milk
pkg of cigarettes
towel
pr of shower sandals
pkg of toothpaste
tooth brush
bar of soap

2 cans of

2
1
1
1
1
1

3.

Packets for new

bom

babies.

Each new bora baby will receive:

cans of milk
meters of cloth
1 towel
1 bar of soap
1 bottle of Tiger Balm
5

5

Packets for servicemen in isolated posts.
month:
4.

One packet is provide each

1 towel
1 bar of soap
1 pkg of toothpaste
1 tooth brush
1 pr of shower sandals
4 pkg of cigarettes

Packets for families that are victims of natural disasters (families that
are victims of war damage will be taken care of on an individual basis). Each
family will receive:
5.

5

meters of cloth

1 mosquito net
1 blanket
1 sauce pan
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type of payment was an indemnification
payment for survivors of servicemen

killed in action or those wounded and
of

As

August,

1969,

the

Social

in

hospital. 75

Service

Department

supported

kindergartens, 169 elementary schools and seven
secondary schools

121

in South

Vietnam, supplying, equipping and maintaining the
schools and paying the
teachers' salaries.
of the schools.

Local cormianders were responsible for the
construction

The students of the schools operated by the
Department had

higher average scores in national testing than did
the students of the public
schools 76
.

The

Department

sponsored

fifty-eight

dispensaries,

twenty medical

stat ions and thirty-eight maternity clinics throughout the country.

During

the first half of 1969 over 30,000 dependents were treated or
cared for in

these faci

1 i

t

ies

.

^

The realization of its responsibility to provide activities for the

young dependents of the servicemen came late to the Social Services Department,

too

late

for

any

serious

implementation of plans

to

provide all

dependent housing areas with such activities as Boy and Girl Scout organizations and other youth activities.
is

In any case the benefits of such programs

doubtful in view of the desperate situation both militarily and socially

and the almost inescapable probability that such plans were inspired by a

well-meaning but woefully misinformed American official.
The Chaplain Directorates provided for the spiritual welfare of the

service members

and

their

dependents,

widows

provided educational facilities (in addition
Department

)

and

orphans.

They

also

to those of the Social Services

by organizing, bui lding and operat ing schools for the dependents

of military personnel and providing social welfare services for military

personnel and their dependents, widows and orphans.

,
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The Directorates were three separate,
autonomous entities responsible

directly to the Chief, GPWD.

Each Directorate had its own organic
logistical

and administrative support.

They included chaplains down through
regimen-

tal

level

in tactical units and through provincial

level on an area basis.

The Protestant Directorate, with a limited constituency,
had chaplains only
at corps and division

level.

The chaplains performed the rites, ceremonies and
religious instructional

duties

required by each particular

activities each directorate pub

1 i

shed

a

faith.

In

support

these

of

magaz ne (in coord i nat ion wi th the
i

Psywar Department) financed from appropriated (governmental) funds.
In the field of

educa t ion, the directorates were dependent entirely upon

their own resources to organize, build and operate schools.

provided only the land.

In the

The government

area of welfare services all the directorates

were greatly dependent upon gifts of money and assistance

in

kind from

American and other "free world" sources.

The care of refugees, widows and

orphans

their

had

the

highest

priority

in

welfare

activities.

The

inadequate resources of the Social Service Department could not prevent

extreme hardship in virtually every case of
chaplains thus became

a

a

soldier's death

;

the role of the

crucial one.

The Political Warfare College

,

located in the mountain resort area of

Dalat, about 130 miles northeast of Saigon, was the successor to a psywar
school in Saigon (when the only aspect of polwar in which the US advisors had

any expertise was psychological operations, which includes psywar).
1965,

it

was

renamed the Political Warfare School

(Nationalist Chinese

advisors were already on the scene) and in 1966 was moved to Dalat.
its

name was again changed,

this

In

Later

time to the Political Warfare College.
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Eventually this "college" was to become the center
of all political warfare
training, but by the end of the war

company level polwar officers.

it

still was concentrating on producing

Nonetheless, the mission statement called

for providing a college level educational program
to produce active duty

(regular) RVNAF political officers, political warfare branch
training for

existing RVNAF officers, and for organizing and directing
political warfare
specialist

training as

required.

Although its organizational chart

extremely impressive (see Chart 10 on the following page)
sufficient

in

program(s)

of

either

the

number

instruction.

of

instructors

Routinely,

civilian

advisors were flown from Saigon to Dalat
conferences.
the

to

or

it

was not self-

development

professors

present

is

of

its

and

other

lectures or

chair

The Polwar Col lege, considered the key to the future success of

entire polwar effort

in

South Vietnam,*

expanded rapidly,

and RVN

officials in the late 1960s projected that by 1975 the college would be an

accredited educational institution on par with many civilian universities.
Ironically, the year projected for this accompl i shment was that in which the

ccnmunists became unconditionally victorious.

successfully in Vietnam today, but

it

is

A polwar system operates

the descendant of the Corrmunist

Chinese system which was adopted by the Viet Minh in 1938.
The mission of each of the Political Warfare Battal ions was to provide

support to the RVNAF for troop education, motivation and indoctrination,

civic

action,

and

psywar

support

of

tactical

operations.

Of

the

five

battalions in Vietnam one was assigned to each of the four Corps Tactical

*

Probably, this was an enemy consideration as well; on 1 April 1970, the
college was attacked by a force of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army
troops, who inflicted heavy damage and casualties.

1

Chart 10
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Zones and under the operational control of the
zone corrmander whi le the fifth

polwar battalion was in general reserve in
the Capital Military District
(Saigon).

battalions.

The

GPWD

exercised

close

staff

supervision

over

all

the

addition to their other responsibilities the battal
ions were

In

responsible for the collection of polwar intelligence in
their respective
areas of operation.

The polwar battal ions were composed of a battal
ion head-

quarters, an administration and technical company,
four

political warfare companies (see Chart

11).

oriented toward three familiar target audiences:

cultural platoon, and

a

Their activities were
the RVNAF

itself,

the

civilian populace, and the enemy.

Activity aimed at the ARVN soldier and his dependents was primarily
the form of info rma tion and entertai nmen t.

Skits andpl ays we re presented by

the cultural platoon, and movi es were shown regul ar ly

units

distributed magazines,

newspapers,

in

stamps

.

and

In addi

t

ion

envelopes

soldiers and provided medical treatment to their dependents

(

with the Social Services Department and other medical units).

in

,

po lwar

the

to

coordination
In

recruiting

centers battalion personnel conducted question and answer sessions with
t

rainees

Polwar directed at the civilian populace in contested areas received
The delivery of the "government message" to civilians was

great emphasis.

conducted by sma 11, semi - autonomous psywar-c ivic action teams which
buted magazines

,

di s

t r

i

-

newspapers and leaflets, printed and pictorial posters and

banners, showed movies and broadcasted with mobile loudspeakers.

Medical

aid was popular with the people as was cultural group entertainment in the
form of singing and dancing, plays, etc.

The most effective means of

Chart

11
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POLITICAL WARFARE BATTALION ORGANIZATION

CULTURAL PLATOON
(POLWAR BATTALION)
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reaching the civilian populace, however, was
face-to-face corrmunication.
Personal visits and conversations were held as
much as possible, down to the

village and hamlet level.
Polwar

activities

aimed at

the

enemy were

implemented by

leaflet

dissemination, loudspeaker messages, and the production and
distribution of
government posters, banners and slogans.
"returnees" (enemy defectors)

,

Visits to and entertainment of

their families, or both, were provided also,

to a lesser extent, whenever possible.

Enemy oriented operations usually

took place in a situation where an ARVN unit was in direct contact
with the

enemy

,

especial ly in cases where the enemy was surrounded.

affairs teams had the capabi

1 i

The psywar-civi

1

ty for the limited production of quick reaction

leaflets which could be used to exploit surrender appeal situations during

psywar support of infantry operations.
The administration and technical company operated the battal ion finance

section, the motor pool, a printing and drafting section and a signal and

photo section.
f

ive teams

:

The cultural platoon, as shown in Chart 11, was composed of

wh i le the theater team per formed skits and plays

,

the music team

provided supporting and background music; the classical music team provided
its specialty, and the singing and dancing team performed to traditional and

modern music.
sound and

The smallest element is the technical team which provided

lighting

specialists

who ensured

the

proper

acoustical

and

background settings for all performances.
The four polwar Companies were identically organized with a company

headquarters,

a

polwar

intelligence

team,

a

political

platoon, and two psywar-civil affairs teams (see Chart 12).

indoctrination
The intelli-

gence team provided po lwar intelligence for company and bat tal ion use

.

The

Chart 12
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ORGANIZATION OF POIWAR COMPANY

PSYWAR/CA
PLATOON

~

PSYWAR/CA

TEAM
1

I,

PSYWAR/CA TEAM
(POLWAR COMPANY)

ENGINEERING
SPECIALIST

69

political indoctrination platoon contained a
political education team, a
unit activities team, and a cultural welfare
service team.

education team presented routine

t

roop educat ion programs

The political

The unit activi-

.

ties team was responsible for improving morale,
strengthening loyalty to the

central

government and

improving

the

troops’

solidarity by organizing

various unit activities such as collective birthday parties,
debate competitions

and songfests.

The

cultural

welfare

service

team provided

company with the basic troop entertainment tools, specializing
propaganda, sport contests and teaching hobbies.
dancers

and

civilian

females

each

in cultural

Soldier musicians and

organized group singing and dancing and

performed small dramas and skits.
The eight psywar-civil affairs teams of each company were composed of
e i gh t

men each (see Char t 12).

The team

1

eader

,

an officer, was a qualified

photographer; his NCO assistant was a draughtsman for posters and banners.
Two enlisted men were sound special

i

s

ts and projector operators

An enl

.

i

s

t-

ed mimeograph operator, public health NCO, agriculture-supply specialist
(NCO), and an NCO who specialized in engineering completed the team.

Finally,

the

Military Security Department --which

was

provided

US

advisors not from the US Pol war Advisory Group but directly from the office of
the Ass i stance Chief of Staff, J-2, US Military Assistance Corrmand

and

about

whose

specific

activities

little

or

pub 1 i shed- -was assigned the following missions:

classified

i

n forma t ion

nothing

has

,

Vietnam,

ever

been

ensuring the security of

and military activities; conduct ing counterespionage

operations; performing counterintelligence missions; conducting security

investigations of RVNAF personnel; and researching and studying documents
relating to enemy plans, operations, organization, intelligence and base

70

areas.

It is

enough to say that while the other elements
are all fundamental

to the success of any polwar organization,
without an effective security

department there could be no hope of even initiating
such an organization.

Political Warfare in Military Units and Organizations
The overall mission of polwar staffs "outside" the
GPWD, in military
units and organizations, was the same as that of GPWD,
with responsibility for

achieving the same intermediate objectives.

The general scope of activity

was the same; however, the activities were adapted to the level
of the unit or

organization.

Every military unit or organization in the RVN had a polwar

element.

The highest level operating military organization was the Corps

(Tactical

Zone)

and each corps contained a complete polwar staff.

division, regiment and battalion also had

a

Each

polwar staff (see Charts 13,

14

and 15 for examples of staffs at various levels).
The polwar staff at all levels supported the conmander by keeping him

informed of the state of morale and discipline within his unit as well as on
the state of civi 1 -mi

1 i

tary relations in his area of operations.

The staff

prepared the polwar annex to all unit operations plans; this annex included
plans for psywar and civic action activities as well as the information

mentioned above relating to the troops and civilians in the area.

Addi-

tionally, the polwar officers prepared and implemented plans (subject to the

conmander

1

s

approval) for the improvement of the unit's troop and dependent

welfare, for mot i vat ion- indoct r inat ion-educat ion programs and other moral
and esprit de corps-building activities, and for counterintelligence

Chart 13
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POLWAR STAFF ORGANIZATION
(CORPS LEVEL)

POLWAR STAFF ORGANIZATION
(DIVISION LEVEL)

Chart 14
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POLWAR STAFF ORGANIZATION
(REGIMENTAL LEVEL)

POLWAR staff organization
(BATTALION LEVEL)

Chart 15
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POLWAR SECTION
(AT SECTOR LEVEL)

POLWAR SECTION
(SUB-SECTOR LEVEL)
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activities.

Final ly, the staff planned and implemented
psywar and counter-

propaganda operations and activities in support of
national campaigns and

in

consonance with the immediate tactical situation.
The polwar staffs in support units and other non-combat
organizations

were responsible for planning and implementing polwar
activities within
their organizations.

In the

case of training centers or schools they were

responsible for integrating appropriate political education
programs into
the normal curricula.

The Company Polwar Organizat ion was (and

most

important element

in

is

polwar systems) the

the entire political warfare system (this

consonant with there being no polwar without
reason for this fact

is in all

fairly evident:

a

it

security system).
is

The basic

the company level

at

is

(or

battery in artillery units, perhaps troops in armored or mechanized units)
that one finds

the soldiers; battalions are comprised of companies and,

taking a quantum leap upward, so are entire armies.

To argue that in line

with this reasoning the squad or fire team

is too reduct ive since

is

more basic

efficient and effective control at that level would be impractical to the
point of self defeat.

The company polwar officer is singularly important

then because it is at this level that the polwar system comes into direct

contact with the vast majority of soldiers.

At

company level,

in most

armies, soldiers usually are conscripts rather than professional regulars,
so problems such as discipline, morale and desertation are more acute

.

The

polwar officer at this level is the only person in the entire system who must
implement all the

f unct

ions of the polwar organizat ion

.

He

political motivation and indoctrination officer, as well as

i

s a

a

combination

chaplain and a

psywar, social welfare, sports and recreation, press and information, civil

affairs and counterintelligence officer.

.
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The primary mission of the RVNAF company
polwar officer was to support
the company coriander by trying to
eliminate the conditions which caused
low

morale and desertions.

He had to create a unit spirit among
the troops by

providing them with political and ideological
direction through mot ivat ion
and indoctrination programs; and he had to
detect and neutralize those

individuals whose activities or even attitudes were
prejudicial to the best
interests (according to national policy) of his unit.

Meanwhile, he had the

additional psywar duty of assuring a proper relat ionship
between his unit and
the civilian populace in the area of operations, and he
also was responsible
for psywar operations against

the enemy.

Some of his rather mundane but

difficult and important duties in attempting to accomplish his primary

mission included:

troop and dependent welfare activities, entertainment of

troops (this can mean literally leading them in song!

)

,

ensuring that proper

sanitary conditions and personal hygiene attitudes existed, and ensuring
that the unit's food and living conditions were adequate.

Some of these

duties would be familiar to one who may have had experience as an executive

officer in the lower echelons of the US Army or perhaps another Western army.
This

is not

surprising since in the RVNAF system the company polwar officer

served also as the unit's executive officer (again, the unified system).
The company level organization was amasterpiece of low level organization consisting of the Polwar Officer

We

1

f are

Chart

Corrmi

16).

activities.

t

tee

the

The

,

,

Polwar NCO, Polwar Fighter Corrmittee,

Psywar Team, and several Secur i ty Maintenance Cel

Polwar

polwar

NCO assisted
officer

and

the

Polwar

Officer

NCO positions were

prescribed by the TOE (table of organ i zat ion and equipment
and psywar team were informal

,

in

similar to unit fund

corrmi

t

)

the

;

all

Is

(see

polwar

only

the corrmi

ones
t

tees

tees in the US Army

Polar tasks had to be performed in addition to regular duties.

Chart 16
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COMPANY LEVEL POLWAR ORGANIZATION
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Security Maintenance Cell

t
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The Polwar Fighter Committee was made up
of one soldier from each squad

m

the unit.

natural

The Polwar Officer selected those whom he
considered to be the

leaders

operator's term)

(key communicators would be
.

These were formed into teams

the American
,

psychological

one team to a platoon.

The

mission of the Polwar Fighter was to detect and report
the general grievances
of the soldiers to the Polwar Officer.

the causes of these grievances

,

fai

1

The Officer then attempted to correct

ing which, he would instruct the Fighters

to go back to their squads and explain why the
problems could not be resolved

and why the soldiers should work hard to bear, if they could
not overcome,
these adversities.

Individuals with personal problems were singled out and

the problems dealt with in a personal way and on an individual basis.

The

Fighter also was used by the Polwar Officer to motivate and indoctrinate
the

other members of his squad.

He did this by "setting the example" and by

explaining to the men why they had to continue to do what they were doing, to
carry on with themissi on or cause."

He became the "big brother" to the men

in his squad.

The Welfare Committee was composed of one elected soldier from each

squad and was responsible for organizing sports and educational and cultural

activities within the unit.

The Corrmi ttee also organ ized songfests, parties

and other recreational activities, and was responsible for monitoring and

helping to improve the unit's food and general living conditions.

All their

activities were aimed at making the soldier's life mo re tolerable, developing
his espr

i

,

and making him feel

like he was a member of a "big family."

The Psywar Team was responsible for all psywar activities within the
unit and was made up of one man per squad or less, appointed by the Polwar

Officer.

Psywar Team per sonne 1 were trained in loudspeaker use, poster and
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banner lettering, intelligence collection for
polwar use, and the furtherance of the unit's good relationships with
the civilian populace.
Finally,

the

Security

Maintenance

Cells

consisted

of

individual

soldiers wi thin the unit who were appointed by the
Polwar Officer to serve as
his

special

informants.

reports in secret.

They were

"compartmentalized"

and

made

their

They were taught to detect "variations" in the
behavior

of their fellow soldiers and to report anything which
might indicate a soldier

was preparing to desert or was engaged in espionage
activity.

were located throughout the company at all levels.

These "cells"

The nimber of cells per

squad or platoon was at the discretion of the Polwar Officer.

Although

theoretically these security personnel were anonymous and operated clandestinely, it would be an unusual company corrmander who would not wish to know
their

identities.

depend upon

a

Whether the Polwar Officer would agree to this would

number of factors, not the least of which would be his personal

rapport with the corrmander and perhaps his opinion of

that

corrmander 's

trustworthiness or even loyalty to the existing government.
Conclus ion
As men t i oned earlier, the essence of political war fare was found in its

application in company level units.

The observer who can understand the

activities, organization and techniques at this’ level would have

a

solid

foundation for understanding the entire concept of political warfare.

It

was helpful also to understand why political warfare took the form which

existed in South Vietnam.
struggle

Throughout its existence there was a constant

between military and political

forces within

and without

the

military to alter the concept, organization and techniques of the system.
American advisors also were actively engaged in this debate as were,

to a

79

lesser extent, the Nationalist Chinese advisors.

came to every mi
of unity of

tary man

1 i

coomnd?"

'

s

mi nd was

Ideal ly

i

t

:

The first question which

"Does this sys tern di srupt the concept

did not

,

or should not

;

the system, however

,

never was completely tested, so there was no way of
assessing its effectiveness.

The explanation of why the sys tern evo lved as

why

was organized as

it

instructive and helpful

it

t r

ad i

t

i

did andmost especial ly

was at company level is interesting and may be

in determining whether

political organization of mi
The

it

1 i

such an approach to the

tary forces in other countries may be feasible.

ona 1 author i tar i an way o f corrmand

i

n or i en t a 1 armi es did not

permit a commander to listen to or even consider the grievances of his troops

who usually were considered just one step above animals.
little cultural

Further there was

experience of individual human rights or dignity.

Even

though in "emerging" countries, such as Vietnam, the people are carefully

courted from time to time, the term "people" refers to the people as
and not as individuals.

whole

a

As a result, passive submission to authority has

long existed among people of such countries, especially in the armed forces,

where the commander exercised virtually unlimited authority.
situation there

is no

In

such a

dialogue between the soldier and the commander.

And

without such agencies as an "Inspector General," chaplain, or Red Cross
representative, as we have in the US armed forces (or counterpart organizations

in

other Western

forces),

or

even

recourse

to

such

less

formal

procedures as the "commander's hour" favored by some officers commanding at
the company level, 78 the soldier has no recourse for his grievances.

choices are few and rather bleak:

hardship inflicted upon him)

,

His

he can take the commander's abuse (or other

he can desert, or in extreme cases --such as that

80

of the rebellion of Egypt's Central Security
Forces in February 1986, which

will discuss in the concluding part of this thes

i

s— he

may rebel or mutiny.

To some extent the "orientalism" of "losing
face" can be applied,

varying degrees,

to

contemporary Moslem countries. 79

Moslems aremore prone to exhibit this "Eastern" trait.
is

"

Islamici ty" which plays a major role.

I

Obviously,

In the

in

Asian

Middle East

it

The point is that if the practice

of Islam (the Shariah*) were strictly adhered to there
would be no problem of

confrontation between officer, or commander, and subordinate since
according
to the teaching of Mohammed all men are equal.

Of course, it follows that

under the strictest observance of this instruction conceivably
there could be
no organization such as a modern army.
di smay

,

of rank

ible.

The Soviets discovered, to their

that trying to organize an army with selected leaders and no
hierarchy
(

especi a 1 1 y while fighting a war) was imp r act icab le

,

if not imposs-

The fact remains that most nations today whose basic faith

is

Islam

have hierarchical armed forces (including Shilite Iran) which, as with their
Far Eastern counterparts, inhibits confrontation and presentation of grie-

vances from the ranks.

Social stratification plays a major role.

Also,

traditional problems of nepotism, desertion, general corruption, ignorance
and poor civilian-military relations exist.

In

addition to the world of

Islam, parallels exist in the poorer Christian (mainly Catholic) countries of

South and Central America, southern Asian countries such as India, Sri Lanka
and Bangladesh, and among those countries of Africa whose inhabitants are

products of "missionary Christianity" or atavistic animism, or both.
A second sociological phenomenon which exists in Asia and in other parts
of the world (such as Africa) is the extreme difficulty in solving conflict

*

The "straight path"; Canon law of Islam (Islamic law)

"
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between

two

individuals

increased when there

is

by
a

direct

confrontation.

This

difficulty

is

disparity in rank, class, station or authority

between the two individuals.

If a

soldier makes even a mild complaint to an

officer, especially a commander, the officer, but most
especially one in

command, "loses face."

When a real conflict exists, the conmander cannot

admit his fault and rectify the situation. The superior is always
"correct"

and the subordinate always a "troublemaker" who doesn't understand "his

place

.

The oriental solution to this situation has always been to insert a "go

between" to mediate conflicts.

Thus the political warfare officer and his

organization, in all the Asian examples that have been discussed, came into

existence to serve as "go between" (in addition to all their other polwar
duties) to fill the vacuum between the troops and the commander

.

Grievances

can be brought to the polwar organization (or, in another sense, through it)

without attacking the dignity of the commander.

The polwar officer person-

alizes the relationships within the unit in order to provide the soldier with
a feeling of fami lial

his own family.

problems

Ideally, he is made to feel that he can take his personal

those he would normal ly take to his parents, to his polwar officer.

,

To enhance this

engages

security in the military after he has been uprooted from

in

such

feeling of familial

reassurance the polwar organization

homely activities as

discussing personal

problems,

and

listening

even

to

general

songs

teaching

to

grievances,
the

troops,

activities which the commander could not engage in without detracting from
his image.

The primary objective of the polwar officer then

commander by el iminati ng the cond i

t

i

ons wh i ch cause

1

is

to

support the

ow moral e and desertion

.
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(or worse), by creating a unified spirit
among the troops and providing them

political or ideological direction through
motivation and indoctrination

programs, and by detecting and neutralizing
individuals whose activities are

prejudicial to the interests of the unit.

His additional duties of ensuring

good civilian-military relations and of
conducting psywar against the enemy
are secondary to this primary mission.

Let us turn now, in the conclusion of

this thesis, to the possible application of
polwar elsewhere in the world

today

PART III

THE RELEVANCE OF POLWAR TODAY

Introduction
The fundamental inquiry of this thesis, as
stated in the introduction,
is:

Would a polwar system such as that of South Vietnam
in the 1960s have

application to countries of the "free world" today,
especially those with
large standing military forces?

A corollary to this question might be:

What role, if any, can the United States play in
introducing such a system to
such countries?
In

order to test the applicability of RVNAF-type polwar today

i

t

may be

helpful to look at Egypt, whose favor the US has courted since the British

presence there demater ial i zed following the Suez Crisis of 1956
except

during

provided much mi

interruptions
1 i

such as

the

Egyptian-Soviet

tary and economic assistance to Egypt
i

the armed forces, saw little improvement.

The US has,

rapprochement,

But whi lemoney and

.

material poured in, conditions among the Egypt an masses

.

,

including those in

Following the equivocal conclu-

sion of the 1973 War, economic and social conditions were exacerbated by a

feeling of isolation from much of the Arab world caused by the late President
Sada t's peace initiative with Israel.

Added to this was the rise of Isl ami sm

which, after inspiring the assassination of his predecessor, continues to

plague

the

regime of Hosni Mubarak.

One manifestation of Egypt's many

discontents was the mutiny of her Central Security Forces in late February
1986.

Egypt's Central Security Forces Rampage
On 25 February 1986 some 10,000 members of Egypt's Central Security
Forces, or CSF, joined later by an unknown number of civilians, went on a

83

;

84

rampage.

They burned and vandalized luxury hotels
and night clubs near the

Pyramids in Giza, adjacent to Cairo, inflicting
some $165 million worth of
damage.

The young conscripts— whose tasks normally
include curbing riots,

guarding embassies and public buildings and
installations, and controlling
traffic

—

f ought

battles with military units, helicopter gunships,
tanks and

armored personnel

carriers which were

sent

in

to

quell

the

uprising.

Meanwhile, the unrest spread to other quarters and suburbs
of Cairo.
inmates

of

a

religionists,

large

prison

were set

in

free.

Tura,

near Cairo,

Government

troops

members in Asyut and Sohag in upper Egypt and

in

I

smai

The

including many Muslim
also clashed with CSF
1

ia and Tenth of

Ramadan

City, northeast of Cairo.®®
An around-the-clock curfew was ordered for Cairo and some governorates

after four days, as peace was restored, the curfew gradually was lifted.

Casualties amounted to 107 dead and 719 wounded or injured. 81
2

,

More than

500 members of the CSF and some 700 civilians were arrested, and within a few

days the Minister of the Interior as wel
di smi ssed

;

1

as 21 ,000 of his CSF conscripts were

four police corrmander s were reduced

i

n rank .82

blamed the rampage on "a small group of devi at ioni sts

parliamentary

investigations

had

shown

that

no

Pres i dent Mubarak
,

"

and added that

foreign,

religious

or

ideological plots were behind the uprising. 83
The mut i ny which had been brewi ng for some time, underscores the deeply
,

rooted economic and social problems and continuing social crises facing a
count ry wi th an exploding populat ion, a crushing foreign debt and a historyof
three costly wars, following a revolutionary change in government, over
peri od of on 1 y twenty years

.

a

Egypt 's current forty-eight million people are

increasing at the rate of about one million every nine months 84
.

Aside from

85

the usual reasons for high population growth
in an underdeveloped society,

Egypt’s religionists maintain that western interest
in population control in
their country is part of an imperialist plot to limit the
number of Muslims in
the world.

The intensive American involvement in family
planning programs

widens; therefore, their resistance to birth control.
in rural Egypt (for both

males and females)

,

where mater ial assets are few,

tied closely to the number of children a couple have.

entrenched belief that the answer to

a

After all, prestige
is

Also, there is an

growing population lies in increased

development rather than limited family size.

During the last

two years

a

steep decline in world oil prices has

"robbed" the country of foreign currency.

The related loss of remittances

from Egyptian workers who had lost their jobs in the Persian Gulf’s slowing
oil economy with its attendant drop in Suez Canal

revenue, together with

stagnating tourism in the aftermath of the Achille Lauro affair serve to
emphasize

the

economy's

underlying weakness.

Many Egyptians,

trace their economic problems to the open door pol icy inf i tah
by the late President Anwar Sadat.

,

however,

adopted in 1974

Rather than long-term investment

in

productive industries leading to a stronger and more stable economy, infitah

merely produced

a

very weal thymercan tile class.

As a result it widened the

gap between the wealthy few and the poor majority.
On

7

October 1985, Palestinian gunmen hijacked the Achille Lauro, an

Italian cruise liner, off the Egyptian coast.

passage the hijackers surrendered:

With Egypt's promise of safe

but when US warplanes forced down the

Egyptian airliner carrying these hijackers the Egyptians felt humiliated.
For ordinary Egyptians, this confirmed what they had long suspected:

their count ry was little more than a co 1 ony of the United States.

That

University

86

students indifferent cities demonstrated
against the US; but

it

takes little

in Egypt to turn any complaint into
one against the Egypt ian government

centuries the Egypt ians were ruled by occupiers

,

.

For

no matter under what guises,

and most Egyptians, even those who are too
young to have lived under colonial
or

other

foreign

rule,

still

carry

their

old

feelings

of

resentment.

Religionists and leftists, opposed to Egypt's ties
with the US and Israel,
became even more vocal, raising government concern.
The dust had barely settled when,

enroute to Malta, was hijacked.

in November,

an attempt

In

to

an Egypt-Air

free

liner,

the passengers,

Egyptian troops who stormed the plane started a fire which killed
sixty of
those on board.

Again, Egyptians sharply criticized their government for

the clumsy handl ing of the rescue operation.

A few weeks later the CSF were

used to suppress other disturbances in Cairo and the Delta which followed
rumours that the al leged suicide of an Egyptian border pol iceman, jailed for

killing seven Israelis in the Sinai, was actually a murder corrmitted by

members of Israeli intelligence who had visited the prisoner
reporters;

the rumours alleged further that

involved in a cover-up of the incident

.

in the

guise of

the Egyptian government was

Soon after that the CSF were used to

suppress cot ton worker s striking for pay increases at Mahala al-Kubra in the
Delta.

The next blow came in February, the month of the CSF uprising, when

Jordan's

King

Hussein

ended

his

Egyptian-backed

cooperation with

the

Palestine Liberation Organization, an event which left Egypt at loose ends,
with

the

ghost

of

government's neck.

the

"separate

peace"

with

Israel

wound

around

the

87

The CSF rampage of February,

1986 is, undoubtedly,

the most serious

internal problem which President Mubarak
has faced since he took office
in

October, 1981 following the assassination
of President Sadat.

As Mubarak

said at the time:
This is a treacherous blow to the march
of this
people struggling for its livelihood
and its
future.
This happened at a time when Egypt
was
making every effort to develop and build
on every
field and to confront difficult economic
condit

It

ions .85

was at this time that Mubarak appointed the
Governor of Asyut to the post of

Minister of the Interior.

The newminister, in his former post as leader in

Asyut--a stronghold of Muslim and Christian
fundamental

is ts— had

acquired

wide experience in quelling the 1981 revolt, which
cost Sadat his life, and
the subsequent religious turbul ence 86
.

Understandably, one may question whether the CSF insurrection was as
spontaneous as

it

may have seemed.

Some have suggested that

,

considering the

simultaneous uprising in different and separated governates in the country,
the action may have been an organized attempt to topple the
government.

To

support this, the Egyptian Minister of Information at that time reportedly

revealed that fifteen of the multineers who were arrested each were carrying

exactly fifty Egyptian pounds (currency)

may

have

been

paid

saboteurs.

,

raising the possibility that they

There was

other

speculation about

organized involvement of religious zealots and agents provocateurs 87
.

the

The

majority, however, saw the rampage as genuinely spontaneous, feeding off

a

deep-rooted discontent caused, among other things, by price increases,
sporadic shortages of food and other goods,

a

trend toward religious

reconstitution, and more importantly, intolerable frustration in the ranks
of the Central

Security Forces.

88

The government, on its part, declared
that the conscripts were outraged

when rumours spread that their tour of service
was to be extended from three to
four years.

The government denied the truth of these
rinours.

Newspaper

reports that a salary increase was being denied
by the government whi le at the
same time the nimber of free train tickets for
CSF menbers was being reduced

also were suggested as factors adding to the
anger within the CSF.

Whatever

the validity of those reports may have been the
fact remains that those CSF

draftees, drawn from Egypt’s poorest rural backwaters,
are notoriously ill-

treated by their middle-class officers and subjected
to the perhaps less

tangible but equally humiliating fate of suffering the jibes
and contempt of
their more sophisticated counterparts, the Cairene (and other)
university

students.

Though conditions for these young conscripts may have improved

somewhat (most probably, mainly in a cosmetic way) their lot
one.

is a

miserable

Quartered in wretched barracks facing the luxury tourist hotels of

Ca iro, they are pa id the equi va 1 ent of three do liars per month

,

enough to buy

two soft drinks in those same hotels which, not surprisingly became their

first targets when their tolerance reached its limit.

Though they come from humble backgrounds these "dirt poor" young men
have a quiet pride and dignity, based largely on their religion which they

practice with more seriousness than the more sophisticated city dwellers.
These dissatisfied (but armed

)

members of traditional Muslim peasant

ies were effectively given the responsibility of Cairo's security.

f

ami

1

-

Torn by

the sharp contrast between their own lifestyle and that of the people they

were protecting, whether the "ha If -naked" Western tourist (an abomination by

Muslim standards) or the snobbish and extravagant Cairene, the downtrodden
youngsters simply vented their anger on the most conspiciuous and hedonistic

,

89

symbols of the wealth they were denied:
just outside the gates of their camps.

the luxurious hotels that were
handy

After all,

i

was just a cut in bread

t

subsidies which led to the huge food riots
that almost overthrew President
Sadat in 1977.

The CSF incident, therefore,

is not

upper classes or the Egyptian government;

just a case of the CSF versus the
it is

symptomatic and representa-

tive of the discontent of the whole sprawling
mass of have nots against

symbols of inequity and humi 1 iat ion— i

t

is

the violent cry of deepseated

frustration emanating from all but the uppermost layers of
Egyptian society.
For the poorest

,

among whom the rioting conscripts can be nimbered,

it is the

realization that they never will be able to improve their living
standards,
let alone attain the riches (to a Westerner, especially to an
American, this

must be seen as

a

relative term) they can see around them.

For the less poor,

such as (for example) noncorrmi ss i oned officers and commissioned officers in
the lower grades in all

the armed services,

it

is

the knowledge that any

improvement they may have experienced in the past quite probably will not be
repeated.

Nevertheless, the President's senior political advisor insisted

tha t the street bat ties did not const i tute a mas s upr i

s

i

ng 88
.

Thi

s

statement

totally ignores the fact that the social fabric of the "Arab" world's largest
poorest
pivotal

,

and most inf luencial country can now only be held together by the one
force that ensures internal security:

the Egyptian army.

It

is

small wonder then that Egyptians are talking increasingly of Field Marshal

Abu-Ghazala, the curent Minister of Defense, as a strong possible candidate
as

the future fifth military president.

OQ

Contrary to the centuries-old experience the Egyptians have endured,
threats to their country now seem to come more from within.

If the under lying

90

causes of the "February Rampage" aremore
profound and complex than the sudden
and relatively localized mutiny of the
CSF would suggest, so too are the

implications, both for the future of Egypt and for
the Middle east generally,
For Egypt, continuing instabi

1 i

ty wi

only help to strengthen the appeal of

1 1

groups hostile to President Mubarak's policies.

Both left-wing radicals,

and more importantly, Muslim religionists
would benefit, and the ascendancy
of either would threaten Egypt
ism,

's

existing measure of democracy and secular-

and its pro-Western stance.

But any change of this order would have

effects reaching far beyond Egypt's borders, especially if the
change were
induced by the religionists' wing.
The CSF rebellion was put down by army forces; but what would
have

happened

if the

soldiers had dec ded to join the
i

r

ebe Is?

Perhaps the Mubarak

regime has been fortunate thus far, but how long can the loyalty of the armed
forces be assumed with any certainty?
by the people

(

If the

role of the armed forces is seen

including the members of the armed forces themselves) as one of

suppression, as one of

a

praetorian guard, Egypt could once more experience

a

revolution, probably inspired in large part by Islamists, not as limited or
eas

i

ly

contained as the February Rampage

,

but of sei smi c proportions; and the

US and its Western allies could be faced with another "Iran."

Speaking about

the army's role under King Farouk, Anwar A1 Sadat once said:

(T)he nice people imagined that the army was a
simple instrument of domination, a kind of whip in
the king's hands wi th which he could keep the poor at
Faruk's praetorian guard and not the
his mercy
.90
nation's safeguard.
.

.

.

.

.

The institution of a polwar organization now to fit the needs of Egypt

armed forces and the country as a whole could be instrumental in the pursui

t

'

s

of

91

stability and development for the Egyptian
people,

Such an

institution
could also provide an excellent example
for any number of developing
nations
throughout the world.

The U.S. Role:

Ci vi

1

-Mi

1 i

tary Models and Control

Any role which the US might play in helping
to make the armed forces of

given country

a

more effective instrument of the national
policy of that

a

country has a great deal to do with American foreign
policy per se
certain countries which the US government favors,
others which

it

.

There are

attempts to

cultivate," and still others whose governments are
held to be inimical to US
interests.

It

is not

the intent of this thesis to argue the validity
of US

foreign policy; to ask whether Jeanne Kirkpatrick and
Norman Podhoretz are
right

in

preferring to support

"traditional"

authoritarian governments

(dictatorships) which are less repressive than revolutionary
autocracies
(some form of Marxism) ,91 or if Noam Chomsky is right when he
calls White House
i

ns

i

s

tence on

i

ncr eased mi

1 i

tary spending and the need to cont inue contain-

ment of

corrmunist takeovers" with "low intensity conflict" a "dirty little

lie. "92

But it is almost certain that whatever its policy the United States

wi

1 1

cont inue to support some countries and many of those countries will be of

the same general

economi ca 1 1 y poor

type as was the Republic of Vietnam:
,

industrially and

ma inly agr icultural, educationally be 1 ow an acceptable

standard, with disproportionately large military-paramilitary forces (by
1970 the RVN had about three million under arms within a population of some

eighteen million), and wi th a government threatened by a strong and potentially violent opposition.

In such a

country, control of the armed forces

crucial to maintenance of governmental status quo.

developed in Marcos's forces

in the

The

f act

is

iona 1 i sm which

Philippines in 1986 led to his downfall.

92

Today, in 1987, it seems the US was
correct in supporting the Aquino

government which

replaced

the

dictatorial Marcos regime.

government of Corazon Aquino has been in power
for over

Now that

a year and

the

appears to

be genuinely interested in the welfare
of the Filipino people, the US
could

consider

urging

Philippines'

that

armed

government

forces

to

to

assist

Janowitz says, "The act of national

implement
in

that

a

polwar

system

in

the

country's development.

As

liberation (in this case not from a

colonial or imperial power but from an internal dictatorial
regime)— with or

without force

establishes a pragmatic basis for

The military,

with

its

symbols

part of

is

the

But given that this were to happen,

.

the armed

legitimate government.

authority and force,

of

apparatus of a legitimate government "93
that

a

forces of a country such as the Philippines,

through an

efficient polwar system instituted with the help of the US, became a more

effective instrument of legit imate civilian control, how then could that

civilian government ensure continued control of those armed forces?
answer lies essentially in the very legitimacy of that government and

relationship with

the military

forces.

Claude Welch

and

The

in its

Arthur

Smith

correctly state:
A1 though in a civic polity the coercive power of the
armed forces may be great, the military political

power is minimized by a complex of factors that
inhibits the military's employment of coercion
independent of civilian direction.
The principal
limiting factor, of course, is the very effectiveness and legitimacy of the civilian political
inst i tut ions 94
.

It

is

important

also

that

the

new government

realize that despite any

"politicization" which might be imposed on the military structure,
accept

the

fact

that

the military,

to

a

it

large extent, must exist

must
in an

93

independent sphere of activity and therefore
military values and interests

must not be subordinated within those of the
larger society (as was the case

with Mao's forces following the Great Cultural
Revolution).
In all

polities with which polwar may be concerned there
are political

(one can say civilian for our purposes since

I

am not speaking of praetorian

government by the military itself) and military elites.

quickly

the

po 1

i

t

ical -mi

1 i

tary

models

totalitarian, and garrison state.
ar

i

s

as:

Let

aristocratic,

us

define

democratic,

The socially and functionally integrated

toe rat i c mode 1 of pre-industrial Europe is archaic; the three
remaining

have currency. 95
The democratic model, more an objective than a reality of political

policy, is found only in some industrialized Western states, and operates
under the ass ump tion that military leaders can be control led and mo tivated by
their

s

t

rong professional ethics.

sources ,96 replaced the ar
change,

there

was

democratic model.

no

i

s

The totalitarian mode 1

toe rat ic model when

fundamental

and

,

,

according to some

in the process of historical

lasting

development

toward

the

Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and the USSR are examples.

Morris Janowitz contends that the garrison state evolves with the weakening
of an effective democratic structure:

The garrison state is not a throwback to military
dictatorships (but) is the end result of the ascent
to power of the military elite under condi t ions of
prolonged
international
tension.
Internal
freedom is hampered, and the preparation for war
becomes overriding (and) military groups directly
or
indirectly wield unprecedented amounts of
political and administrative power. 97

Examples of this last model could include Egypt, Syria, Israel, Nicaragua
and,

in the opinion of some,

the United States.

.

94

These political-military elite models may
be clarified
Samuel

further

Huntington's paradigm of subjective-objective
control.

prime essential

for any system of civilian control

by

"The one

the minimizing of

is

military power," Huntington writes, and by
"military power" he means the
political

power

of

the military. 98

Subjective civilian

control,

says

Huntington, consists of minimizing military power
by maximizing civilian
power, and this always means concentrating that power
in some particular

civilian group or groups
Mao

This can be seen in the totalitarian models

.

CCP control over the PLA as

s

control,

on

potential
renders

the

other hand,

prime example.

a

achieves

the

them

politically sterile and neutral

wi th

Objective civilian

reduction of political

the military by professionalizing

in

,

the military

since

power
this

produces the lowest

(and)

possible level of military political power with respect to all civilian
groups. "99

Also,

preserves that essential element of power which
necessary for the existence of a military
profess i on
A high y trained professi ona officer
corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any
civilian group which secures legitimate authority
within the state.
it

is

.

If

it

is

argued that

1

such decrease

1

in

the military's power may lead to

increased power among more bellicose civilian groups

,

then it can be gainsaid

that the very reduction of the military's potential interventionary threat

makes the same military forces a stronger instrument in carrying out the
policies of the legitimate government, perhaps by controlling those same
bel

1

icose groups

The weakening of civi
is

unavoidable.

1

ian supremacy which occurs in the garrison state

Therefore,

with military groups

wielding

political and administrative power the importance of

a

significant

viable coalition

.

95

between civilian and military authorities

military can

retain

its

organizational

cannot

be

independence

overs t ressed
so

alliances can be maintained with civilian political
al

at

1

long

as

groups.

;

the

proper

One

such

lance could be that of the nation's polwar
officerswithcivilian leaders
the ministerial

Defense

or

cabinet

level

(in most

countries the Ministry of

)

The countries with which we are concerned (for any possible
polwar

application) pr obab y would bes t be desc r i bed as democrat
1

What must

be

understood

that

is

politicizing

the

i

c ga rrison

armed

forces

states.
(i.e.,

instituting polwar) of such countries does not automatically imply making
those armed forces a more dangerous potential
force.

On the contrary

,

it is the

interventionary political

very professionalism and stability which

the polwar process provides which wouldmake the armed forces less a threat to

legit imate civil central governments and more of an effective instrument of

power

for

those governments,

leading away from the need

for

subjective

control and toward more democratization as the state achieves more internal

stability.
In cases such as the Phi

1

ippines it is the army which must help to achieve

this stability, despite the view that military forces become less reliable

when used in police or counterinsurgency roles. 101

The armed forces of such

"new nations" must be employed in any role conceivable to assist in the

stabilization and internal

security of

that

nation.

So

it

is

with

the

Philippines in countering the NPA (National People's Army) threat, in the

newly democratized Argentina in countering latent despotism and tyrannical
injustices in and by

i

ts

armed forces

,

and

i

n Egypt

where

,

as

I

have discussed,

the armed forces were needed to put down the CSF rebellion in 1986.

"

,

96
In sum, polwar, or

"politicizing" military forces, does not implymaking

those forces more politically active in opposing
a legitimate government;
implies

rather,

the

promotion of high professionalism and

indoctrination, soldier welfare programs and surve i

1 1

the

use

it

of

ance means adequate to

ensure the loyalty, cooperation and support of those
forces in developing

a

state system which will further the real interests
of the people of that
state.

And those forces should not be seen merely as a "praetorian guard"

garrisoned and standing by

in time of peace) ready to defend their government

(

from any oppos ition, internal or external.
cont

r

ibute to "developing publ ic works

They can

roads

,

,

,

as Janowi tz points out,

and engineer ing pro jects

relief and economic rehabilitation after major national di sasters
In

countries which the US chooses to assist

civilian control, making the military
of

the

state.

a

Subjective control,

,

.

.

.

.

the goal should be objective

tool, not an opponent or compet i tor

in

the case of

totalitarian states,

especially during critical stages in their development, "civi ianizes" the
1

military, making

it

"the mirror of the state," or as Huntington puts it:

The antithesis of objective civilian control is
military participation in politics; civilian
control
decreases
as
the
military
become
progressively involved in institutional, class,
and constitut ional politics.
Subjective civilian
control, on the other hand, presupposes this
involvement 103
.

Although polwar may survive for
Trotsky's Red Army and Mao

'

s

time under

a

PLAof the late

1

960s

subjective control, as in
,

military professi ona

1 i

sm

eventually will try to reject it; the military elite will always seek that
control which max imi zes prof ess iona 1 i sm and ensures "that distribution of

political power between military and civilian groups which
to the emergence of professi ona 1 a 1

1

i

t

i

s

mos t conducive

udes and behavior among the members o f

97

the officer corps. "104
if they are

Basically, military specialists abhor
politics; but

permitted to execute their military duties
without interference

from "outsiders" they will tolerate polwar officers who
prove that they can

provide tangible assistance in the execution of those
duties.

In

any case,

as Janowitz writes:

Those organizational and professional qualities
which make it possible for the military of a new
nation to accumulate political power, are the same
as those wh ch 1 imi t its ability to rule prope r
1 y
while it is relatively easy for the military to
seize power in a new nation, it is much more
difficult for it to govern. Thus once political
power has been achieved, the mi 1 i tary must develop
mass political organizations of a civilian type, or
i t mus t work out viable relationships with
civilian
political groups. 105
i

.

.

.

In

short,

politicians are needed to govern

civilians or former military leaders

is

a

country; whether they are

immaterial.

Since Argentina has been mentioned, a note on South American totali-

tarian sys terns is needed.

The conservat ive

,

almost

"

feudal

-

1 i

ke" system of

military dictatorship for which South Amer ican countries have been notorious
is

different than that developed in Western Europe in the first part of this

century.

The military dictatorship of one man or junta directly dominates

both military and civilian

life.

Admittedly,

the

Peron

regime

was

a

combination of this older "hereditary" dictatorship and some of the newer
elements found in Europe.

Unfortunately today Argent ina still

is

suffering

from the latent effects of the dictatorial military elitism of its past.

Fortunately however

,

publ ic opinion in that count ry seems to be on the side of

the newly emergent democracy of President Alfonsin.

Here then

example (such as the Philippines) where the US, with

a

polwar assistance and advisory effort

,

is

another

properly organized

could assist the Argentinian govern-

.

98

ment in stabilizing their armed forces and,
fostering a system of democratic

objective civilian control

,

make them helpful and not interventionary

government's efforts in development and internal
solidarity.

in the

But before

such a polwar effort were initiated a
cooperative coalition of civil and

military power would have to be established.

The US should institute no

polwar programs in countries whose armed forces
are not reasonably stable or
in

countries with governments that repress the aspirations
of the people for

more democracy.
I

f

the US mi

1 i

tary

,

in a polwar

assistance and advisory role

effective instrument of national policy, then the

c

i

vi

1

-mi

1 i

,

i

s

to be an

tary relation-

ship within the US must be stable and work in the genuine
interest of the US
public, the new na t ions who would be the bene ficiaries of polwar systems
the rest of the world.

and

With the prior approval of the government of the

'country of interest," the civilian pol icymakers--Congress
of State, the President

,

,

,

the Department

with the advice and consent of his National Security

Counc i 1 --and in close coordination with the military elite (including the

ostensibly civilian but quas i -mi

1 i

tary Secretary of Defense) should be the

arbiters of whether a polwar assistance-advisory effort will

final

be

undertaken
Once an affirmative decision has been made the military experts would
then be responsible for the professional execution of the program.

Under the

present system in the US the Chai rman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Army

Chief of Staff
forces

in

the

government's

(

since polwar efforts would be concerned mainly wi th the ground
host

top

countries)

civilians

would be the key figures

informed of

progress,

in

keeping the

forecasts,

budgetary

matters and all the other details necessary for the efficient conduct of the

.
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program.

The US CIA probably would play a role (a passive
one, one hopes

)

in

keeping the government informed of the political
situation both inside and
outside the armed forces of the country being aided.

If it

begins to appear

that the host country is "going sour" in its stance
toward the US, the polwar

effort should be withdrawn.

If the

wrong choice was made to begin with the

responsibility must (and should) lie with the US civilian leaders.

In all

countries, great or small, the military should be merely an instrument of
policy, not a formulator.

supporting a nation that

The counterproduc t ivi ty which would result from

is or

becomes an enemy hardly warrants mentioning.

On the other hand, polwar assistance to a country which

is

undecided in its

attitude to the US could be fruitful.

According to V. G. Kiernan, Americans should feel comfortable working
with the large military forces of other countries since the US itself
highly militari zed and
t

a1

i

a

is

compat ibility exists between militarism and capi

-

sm
Itself
increasingly militarized, America
found the men of
the
sword attractive.
In
countries as raw and ramshackle as many of this era
(post 1945) an army can be the nearest thing to the
great indus t r i al -f inane i al organizations which
dominate American life. A modern army is an
embodiment of technology, closely geared to
industry by its equipment, rational like big business in its structure and routine
and with an
analogous chain of corrmand. Militarism blends
with capitalism as smoothly as it did with feudal,

.

i

.

.
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Given that the United States will support the military forces of certain
countries whose governments may not be

totally stable,

ourselves what form that support should take.

we may now ask
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In the Spring o£ 1971

,

following his return from Ethiopia, then
US Army

Chief of Staff Westmoreland instructed his
Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil

Affairs/Military Government to contact the US Army
Institute for Military
Assistance

(USAIMA)

Ethiopia."

at

Ft.

Bragg to "discuss advisory requirements

for

When asked about what "kind of problems" and "concepts
USAIMA

should concentrate

on"

in

training men

for

advisory duty

in

Ethiopia

Westmoreland’s representative replied that the Ethiopians
needed training

in

"internal defense" and "internal development" in about
equal parts since

General Westmoreland was "very much concerned about the lack of
appreciat ion
on the part of the Ethiopians for the Civi

hearts and minds of the people."

(This

1

Affairs approach needed to win the
last trite phrase was used--with

fervor by dedicated but ignorant staff and psyop officers, but with
sarcasm

among

combat

Military

troops--persistent ly when Westmoreland was

Assistance

Comnand

,

Vietnam

[COMUSMACV]

)

.

Conmander,

US

Westmoreland’s

assistant went on to elaborate the problem and requirement:
'They' (the Ethiopians) have the ability to
sweep through an area but do not have an appreciation for developing a government in the areas.
They have got to know how to set up hamlet security
forces so the local governments can survive, plus
they have to knowhow to get the people to help them.
Also, they need to know those things which will
develop an area such as roads, medical facilities,
schools, etc.
Presently, vast areas of the country
are not in the hands of the government except where
the military forces are.

The memorandum which contains this informat ion 107 is dated
a

time when

19

May 1971,

intensive instruction was being conducted at USAIMA in the

history, theory and practice of polwar.

Whether "free world" polwar based

upon the South Vietnamese model may have helped the Ethiopians to organize
their armed forces is open to question.

But nothing could have been easier,

,
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during this period of US support for polvvar
in Vietnam, than to organize

a

team

of polvvar advisors (perhaps with technical
assistance from the Republic of

China) for deployment to Ethiopia.

With proper organization and planning,

adequate funding and dedicated execution such
a venture might have played

a

major role in the political stabilization of
Ethiopia and perhaps, to some
extent, even helped to avert or alleviate the
terrible famine of the 1980s
(which took ten years to develop)

,

while serving US foreign policy interests

in western central Africa.

For any polwar effort such as the hypothetical case
just described the

importance of proper advisors cannot be overstressed.

Advisors for politi-

cal warfare duty must themselves be not merely schooled
in its theory and

practice and

t

rained in

i

t

s

techniques

;

indoctrinated in polwar as a virtual

they must themselves be motivated and

ideology in itself.

Moreover,

advisory group in the "host" country cannot "feed that country

democratic meal,

as

the US tried to do in Vietnam.

the

a

square

In his report

to the

American people after he and his colleagues returned from

a "fact

finding

mission" to Vietnam in 1974, former US ambassador John M. Allison admitted,
with obvious re uctance
1

,

that "politically, South Vietnam is not yet a mode 1

of Amer ican-s tyle democracy," adding that "in this, Vietnam does not differ
f

rom

.

.

.

the Ph i

1 i

ppi nes where the US spent fifty years trying to instill the

fundamentals of Amer ican-type democracy ." 108

countries

,

The reasons for this in both

says Allison, are ethnic and social, not political.

which staunchly defends every mistake the United States made
not even mention the polwar effort (about which

expressed his ignorance of the who

1

e

enterpr i se )

I

.

This report

in Vietnam, does

apprised Allison after he
A1 though polwar concepts

,

organization, planning and opera t ions mu s t be moni tor ed closely (at least in
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the early stages) and some supervision is
required throughout its operations
as long as the US is funding part or al

1

of the effort

,

the country of interest

must be free to establish and maintain its own
polity and objectives in both

domestic and foreign policy.

Should its governance become inimical to
US

policy or interests (such as appears to have happened with
the Sandinistas in
Nicaragua) and diplomacy and negotiation fail, the
US representatives should
leave.

However

,

do not think

i t

i

s

overly sanguine to believe that if the US

effort is more altruistic than egoistic the chances
would be better than even
that the governmental system final ly selected by the
host country and kept in

place at least partly by a US inspired and assisted polwar
program would be

compatible with US interests.
The Amer i can adv isors for the sensitive po 1 wa r mission mus t be
careful ly

selected.

Race and ethnicity should fit the country to which the advisor

assigned, if pos sible.

In fact, the

is

entire covert po licy of assigning only a

limited number of officers of a certain extraction to countries of their

ancestral origin because they are not considered representative of the US

Army should be el iminated. 109

University of Hawaii

Probably, there are numbers of Asian (the

ROTC program graduates hundreds annually), black,

Hispanic and "Arabic" officers who, with proper training would be adequate
for the task.

The claim, held mainly by US career officers of Anglo-Saxon,

middle-class background, that such representatives may permit racial or
ethnic sympathies to interfere with "the proper performances of their duties"
is

sheer nonsense.

resources.

advisors

America should utilize its multiracial, multiethnic

The appalling fact is that in too many cases American military

in general

are totally unsuited

for

their

assignments.

Often

racially prejudiced, contemptuous of their foreign counterparts, unquali-

s
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fied inany foreign languages and often total
ly bored wi th their duties, they

muddle through their tours of overseas' duties
and, much like Evelyn Waugh'
"odious American tourists," do nothing to
improve the US image abroad. 110
V. G.

Kiernan, in discussing the inefficiency and
mi sappropr iat ion of

much of US foreign aid tells of a Vietnamese who
allegedly once said to Martha
Gellhorn, "US aid
the peasants. "1

is a long

1 1

pipe wi th many holes in it.

A recent press report alleges that as much as
thirty

percent of US aid to the rebels in Afghanistan

probably by the Pakistanis.

It is a

..hether in funds or materiel,

is

procedure

in

the RVNAF

is

being "syphoned off,"

fact that much US military foreign aid,

either misappropriated, wasted or simply

stolen by government officials or their agents.
payroll

Only a fewdrops reach

The universal system of

(beginning at division

level)

consisted

roughly in the divisional commanding general taking half the division payrol

1

for himself and sending the remainder to his three regimental
commanders in

equal amounts;

there the process was repeated, with the three battalion

commanders of each regiment receiving the residue from their respective
regiments and so on until the troops received what was left,
left. 112

if

anything was

The funds for payment of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces were

provided, as was the funding for the entire war, by the United States.

Problems with material aid exist also, arising mainly from lack of

efficient management and supervision.

Many items are sold on the "black

market" or appropriated for personal use.

Also, since US advisors rarely

speak the host country's language and US technical manuals are publ ished only
in Engl

i

sh more problems arise, espec i al 1 y where equipment

and counterpart soldiers lack technical skills.

i

s

sophist icated

,
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Aid in the form of polwar specialists
who are language qualified,

culturally attuned

to

the

host

country,

thoroughly schooled

polwar

in

techniques, and dedicated to close supervision
of polwar operations and

assets (equipment and funds) might be much
more productive than many other
forms of military aid, especially the practice
of merely conveying materiel

and money to the country of interest.

One of the purposes of polwar

is the

elimination, or at least the significant reduction,
of corruption in the

armed

forces.

Ideally,

the

polwar

system will

require

less

and

less

supervision of all its aspects, including aid money and
equipment, as

it

becomes "institutionalized."

Conclusion
Successful polwar systems have been and should continue to be
tailored
to fit certain needs
i

s

,

so al

1

systems should be studied before the RVNAF model

adapted to suit the requirements of any future po war user
1

;

social

,

ethnic

political, rel igious and even historical factors must be cons idered.

having decided upon an approach,

And,

the positive aspects of polwar must be

stressed, not the negative ones (such as company level security cells),

although unfortunately these latter cannot be avoided.
1950s,

the CIA, with the help of

In Iran in the

Israel's security section,

early

the Mossad,

instituted the infamous SAVAK in their successful effort to return the Shah to
power.

As in the case of Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal, US

authorities, while speaking mainly of the threat of

a corrmunist

takeover,

were outraged when a noncorrmunist nationalist government began controlling

economic and strategic resources (their own) which were important
Wes t

.

1 1

in US po

3

1 i

The point
cy

,

I

ammaki ng aside fromcalling attention to

is that polwar, to

,

to the

a grave error

enjoy cont inued success in the achievement of
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its objectives, must be a balanced,

coordinated effort.

Its

three main

pill ars--good leadership, political supervision
and secur i ty--mus t blend in

concert

(although during certain phases

one may be

stressed,

Trotsky's Cheka during the early history of the Red
Army).

In

as

with

other words, if

the Shah of Iran had been a "good" leader at the
head of a worthy government,

use of the SAVAK (security) as the only control
system would probably have led
to his eventual downfal

1

anyway.

If

one argues that a leader whose interests

are those of his people does not need polwar or some
control system,
say that while this may be true in certain Western countries

countries such as Iran.

And

I

,

I

can only

it is not true in

should add that all Western countries, though

they may have no highly structured control organizations such as
in the earlier parts of this thesis, have nontheless some

I

described

systemof control,

usual ly a comb ination of propaganda (ma i n 1 y through use of the corrmun i ca t i ons

media) and security forces (in the US, the FBI, CIA and NSA)

.

As Jacques

Ellul points out:

Power is regarded as legitimate when it
derives from the sovereignty of the people, rests on
the popular will, expresses and follows that
popular will
The masses are there; they are
interested in politics.
The government cannot act
without them.
So, what can it do?
Only one solution is possible: as the government cannot fol low opinion opinion must fol low the
government. One must convince this present,
ponderous, impass ioned mass that the government's
decisions are legitimate and that its foreign
policy is correct. The democratic State, precisely because it believes in the expression of public
opinion and does not gag it, must channel and shape
that opinion if it wants to be realistic and not
11/1
follow an ideological dream.
.

.

.

.

,

To translate Ellul's view into reality,

the US should reinstitute a

program for the selective use of polwar in countries which may need such

a
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system.

The documents necessary for this-studies

,

lesson plans, programs

of instruction for advisors, foreign
officers and US comnanders and staff

officers, "after action" reports, and others--may
still repose in their vault
files at Ft. Bragg.

But information recently received by the
author from the

Psychological Operations Department of the Special Warfare
Center at Ft.
Bragg made

it

plain that no US polwar training programs, advisory
efforts or

studies are underway.

In short,

the US government appears to have no more

interest in the subject, and, as was the case with
Vietnam in the mid 1950s,

now has nothing to offer except psywar or, to use the broader term,
psyop.
Obviously, the United States abandoned polwar when
If the

adj_

polwar systems--Russian or Chinese Comminist (and

their satellites), Ch i nese Na t i ona list and Viet namese

order to determine which part(s) of any or al
The record of successful

corrmunist mi

abandoned Vietnam.

United States were to reintroduce polwar as an aid to friendly

developing nations,

country.

it

1

itary forces

,

1

— should be ex ami ned

should be appl ied in

polwar practice thus

far

a

i

n

specific

favors

the

both during major upheavals (such as the Russian

and Chinese revolutions) and "low intesity conflicts," and particularly in
their af terma ths when stability among thevictoriousmilitary forces was
is) essential.

(

and

Nonetheless, the obviously "good" or effective aspects of

those corrmunist structures and operations should be considered as well as
those practi ced or at tempted by

" f

ree wor Id" countries

,

such as the Repub lies

of China or Vietnam, for possible future use, and adapted to the needs of

countries whose governmental forms are non-corrmuni s t

.

A totally pragmatic

approach should be taken; certain "labels" which may be offensive

to some

political

indoc-

Westerners,

especially Amer i cans--pol

i

t

i

cal

corrmissar,

trination, clandestine secur i ty--can be changed to make their acceptance

.
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more palatable (the fact

Is all

nations, "danocracies" included, foster
the se

same activities or entities in seme less
coordinated form or other anyway).
The West does not have to accept the politics or
ideology of eemnunist states

along with their concepts and practices of polwar.

The objectives of the

enterprise are, after all, what must be kept in mind.

Whatmust be kept inmind also

is that, as

stated earlier, polwar must not

be seen as a cure for all the world's political, social or
developmental ills.

Without legitimacy of goals, both on the part of the "host country"
and the
"sponsor" who provides the necessary aid (the US), and without

genuine

a

belief in the system itself and high mot ivation in its implement at ion
will

r

ema in, at least in the

interest

.

Polwar

free wor Id," mere 1 y a "gadge t

is not just a

entertaining soldiers--it

is an

system of better feeding

,

"

,

polwar

of more or less

hous ing, paying and

organized effort through which the soldiers

themselves can play a role in assisting

a

legitimate government to better

provide the military (and their civilian counterparts) with those and other
less tangible but perhaps even more important benef i ts--such as human rights
In

conclusion,

"containment

" "
,

if US

foreign policy continues as

it

has--promot ing

low intensity wars," and support of dictatorial government s-

-nothing can be accompl ished through the use of polwar

.

The US must real ize

that it cannot "sell" democracy on the Amer i can mode 1 everywhere

do so;

also,

it

i t

chooses to

must begin to accept and support alternative forms of

government, even those which are based on a socialist approach.

However,

such a change is unlikely in view of the fact that the public opinion which

could cause such a sensible redirection of US foreign policy seems pre-

programmed to provide the government with the support
present policies.

Propaganda, like a gun,

is

i

t

needs to continue its

merely an instrument,

to be

108

used for good or ill.

Its current use by the US government
is working to the

detriment of the count ry
world.

s

real interests as well as those of
the rest of the

Appendix A

109

Comrrand Relations

COORDINATION RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
POLITICAL WARFARE STAFF
AND GENERAL STAFF IN THE CHINESE ARMED
FORCES

TROOP UNITS
This chart shows
Staff in a type

command

headquarters

is

relationships in a type

headquarters.

responsible for coordination in the general and

staff while the director of the political warfare
establishment

nation ot political warfare

deputy

commander.

staff, the chief

unit

is

On

functions.

the

The Chief of

Both

regimental

of

them report

and lower

level

is

special

responsible for coordi-

to

where

the

commander and

there

is

no chief of

of the political warfare establishment or political warfare officer of the

on the deputy commander

level.
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The functions of

the

Political

Warfare Planning Committee are to
study, plan

and

review:

The

P-1

P-2

P-3

a.

Political

b.

Civil affairs policies.

c.

Political

warfare policies.

warfare operations behind the enemy’s

Military Spokesman’s Office

is

lines.

responsible for:

a.

News

b.

Speaking to the public on behalf of the Ministry
of National Defense.

c.

Arranging both Chinese and foreign reporters to

is

release concerning joint operations.

visit

military units.

responsible for

a.

Formulating plans of political warfare operations.

b.

Management of

c.

Organization and training.

d.

Political

warfare personnel service and evaluation of their efficiencies.

e.

Political

warfare operations in the enemy’s rear area.

is

political

warfare personnel.

responsible for:

a.

Psychological warfare activities.

b.

Culture and propaganda activities within

c.

Recreational

is

Armed

Forces.

activities.

responsible for conducting

administrative,

supervision of discipline within the

Armed

tactical

Forces.

and technical

inspections

and the

Appendix B (cont.)

P-4

P-5

P-6

is

Ill

responsible for:

a.

Providing political warfare intelligence.

b.

Safeguarding military security.

c.

Providing counter-espionage measures.

d.

Providing security clearances.

is

responsible for:

a.

Handling

military-civilian programs.

b.

Planning welfare programs and providing welfare services for officers and EM.

c.

Providing services to military dependents.

is

responsible for:

a.

Providing political education for both active duty and reserve personnel.

b.

Conducting

c.

Planning physical training programs.

political training activities.

The Comptroller Office prepares and

reviews budgets and distributes

GPWD

operational

funds. This office also prepares statistical analysis of political warfare activities and procures,

manages and adjusts equipment

utilized in political warfare activities.

The Administrative Office handles

social

relations, screens

and controls

overall clerical

work, and renders administrative support to the various staff sections.

As can be seen most of

Armed

the

functions in the

political

Forces also exist in U.S. military units. The difference

establishment
lies

regarded as separate or additional duties and assigned to separate
staff sections are

combined and discharged

political establishment.

as a

whole

in the

of the

Chinese

wherein several functions
U.S. general and special

Chinese

Armed

Forces by the
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Supporting Units
There are sixteen supporting or operational units which are under the
of

MND

units arc

and supervised by

GPWD

shown on the following

POLITICAL

direct

command

to carry out the political warfare activities. These sixteen

chart:

WARFARE OPERATIONAL

SERVICES SUBORDINATE TO

UNITS

AND

MND

1ST

POLITICAL

CIVIL

STAFF
AFFAIRS

COLLEGE

GROUP
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DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL WARFARE

Appendix

E
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POLITICAL WARFARE INSIGNIA

The Political Warfare insignia is a badge, worn above the right breast
pocket, which consists of a silver star symbolizing leadership, surrounded
by a hexagonal design symbolizing Chiang Kai-shek' s "Six Great Warfares"*
superimposed on a sword, anchor, and wings which symbolize the role of the
Amy, Navy, and Air Force in the carrying out of the six warfare missions.

Warfare,
* Six Great Warfares: Ideological Warfare, Stratagem Warfare, Mass
Warfare.
Intelligence Warfare, Organizational Warfare, and Psychological

.

.
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